谁决定中国的对朝政策?

Who decides China’s policy on North Korea?

谁决定中国的对朝政策？

‘Zhonglianbu’ most influential in decision-making on Pyongyang

中联部很大程度上影响对平壤的政策

By Sunny Lee

李家胜（译）

BEIJING — China issued an unprecedentedly strong condemnation against North Korea in the aftermath of the North‟s nuclear test in October 2006. Characterizing Pyongyang‟s move as a “flagrant” (“hanran” in Chinese) act surprised even some Chinese experts on North Korea who couldn‟t believe their foreign ministry would use such an “undiplomatic” term.

2006年朝鲜核试验之后，北京对朝鲜进行了史无前例的强烈谴责，指责平壤“背信弃义”，很多中国专家甚至不敢相信外交部门会使用这么“不外交”的言辞。

It turned out that the term was not decided by the foreign ministry, but was given from “above,” according to a source familiar with the situation.

后来据消息人士指出，这样强烈的言辞并不是由外交部决定的，而是受到中国高层的指示。

“The foreign ministry had to use the term because it was the expression used by the top leadership, which was very angry about the North Korean nuclear test,” the source said. “The foreign ministry just carried out the instruction.”

“外交部门不得不使用这种强硬的言辞，因为这样的言辞同样被高层领导使用以

表达对朝鲜进行核试验的强烈气愤。”消息人士指出，“而外交部门只不过是执行领导的指令。”

This episode begs the question of “who” in China then makes foreign policy decisions on North Korea.

这一事件回避了一个实质问题，“在中国，谁决定对朝鲜的政策？”

Although educated guesses lead us to think that matters concerning relations with “foreign” countries are supposed to be dealt with by the “foreign” ministry, outside observers for years have also speculated that China‟s ministry may not be the main player in architecting the country‟s major foreign policy on North Korea.

尽管我们一直根据推测认为，中国的外交事务都是有外交部处理的，可是很多观察家经过多年后质疑到，外交部很可能不是主要的构建对朝鲜外交政策的部门。

“Based on my research, the senior Chinese leadership tends to listen more to the opinions of „Zhonglianbu‟ pertaining to the matters on the Korean Peninsula,” said Linda Jakobson, director of the China and Global Security Program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

一位斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所中国与国际安全研究计划的学者琳达·雅各布森指出，“根据我的观察，中国高层领导更倾向于倾听外联部关于对朝政策的意见。”

“Zhonglianbu” stands for the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. The title is so long that even foreign scholars of China prefer to go by its shortened Chinese moniker.

“中联部”全称为“中国共产党中央委员会外联部”（中共中央外联部），这个名称非常长，所以很多外国学者更喜欢称呼它的简称。

“Zhonglianbu is especially influential in the decision-making processes with regard to North Korea, more influential than the foreign ministry,” said Jakobson.

“中联部比外交部更能影响中国的对朝政策”。雅各布森说。

For example, whenever Kim Jong-il visits China, it‟s Zhonglianbu, not the ministry, that arranges all the logistics.

比如，每当金正日访华的时候，是中联部而不是外交部安排后勤。

Zhonglianbu handles the relations between the Communist Party in China and other political parties abroad. This party-to-party relationship has been the particularly pronounced backbone of maintaining China‟s traditional ties with North Korea through the latter‟s Workers‟ Party.

中联部主要负责中国共产党与其他国家政党之间的关系，中联部通过维护中国共产党与朝鲜劳动党的关系在维护中国与朝鲜关系方面发挥了重要作用。

The heads of Zhonglianbu and the Workers‟ Party are usually privileged to see the top leader of the other country during their visits.

中联部与劳动党的领导们在访问期间经常被允许可以拜见其他国家的元首。

For example, in February, Hu Jintao greeted Kim Yong-Il, director of the Workers‟ Party‟s International Department, and remarked, “The Sino-North Korean friendship is a precious wealth of the „two parties‟ and two peoples.”

比如，在2010年2月份，胡锦涛接见朝鲜劳动党国际部部长金永日时指出：“中朝两国友谊是两国政党、两国人民的宝贵财富。”

Likewise, in August last year, Wang Jiarui, director of Zhonglianbu, visited

Pyongyang and met personally with Kim Jong-il, delivering Hu Jintao‟s oral message. 同样，2009年8月，中联部部长王家瑞访问平壤并受到金正日单独接见，传达了胡锦涛的口信。

In understanding China‟s posture toward North Korea, Jakobson said, there is a key figure worthwhile to take notice of. “State Councilor Dai Bingguo is a central person,” she said.

雅各布森指出，在理解中国对朝鲜的态度时，有一个非常重要的人物必须引起我们的注意，即国务委员戴秉国。

Dai used to be the head of the Zhonglianbu before he was promoted to serve as state councilor, a powerful position within the executive organ of China‟s central government, as a national security advisor to Hu Jintao.

戴秉国在做国务委员之前，是中联部部长。国务委员是一个非常重要的中央政策的执行机构，是胡锦涛的重要的安全顾问。

“But Dai is not playing the role of „China‟s Henry Kissinger‟ in coordinating China‟s foreign policy on the Korean Peninsula because he doesn‟t have the independence that U.S. President Nixon gave to Kissinger. That‟s the big difference,” said Jakobson. 雅各布森说，“戴秉国与基辛格不同的是，在决定中国对朝鲜半岛的政策上，他没有尼克松给予基辛格的那么大的自主权。

At the same time, Zhonglianbu is not the only mover and shaker of China‟s foreign policy on North Korea.

同时，中联部也不是唯一的对朝鲜政策的有利影响者。

Above Dai, there is the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee of the

Communist Party of China, which includes Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo and Wen Jiabao. 在戴秉国之上，还有包括胡锦涛、吴邦国、温家宝在内的中央政治局九大常委。

Ultimately, Beijing‟s decisions on Pyongyang are hammered out by these most

important nine individuals, who make collective decisions after going through internal consultations among themselves.

最终，北京对朝鲜的政策还是由这九个关键人物之间通过内部协商之后的集体决策决定的。

According to Jakobson, however, the nine people‟s views on the North are often

divided. “For example, there are those who believe that China under no circumstances should do anything to hurt the feelings of China‟s historically close ally, while there are those who argue for following international practices in dealing with North Korea,” she said.

据雅各布森说，九大常委关于对朝鲜政策经常是有分歧的，“比如，有人认为在任何情况下，中国都不能做有损中朝历史性的联盟的事情，有人认为中国对朝鲜政策应对符合国际惯例”。

“This explains why there was the lapse of the time between the actual sinking of the South Korean navy ship, the Cheonan, and any statement by the Chinese leadership. 这可以解释为何中国政府在“天安舰”事件一段时间以后才做出声明。

“It reflects the situation that there are many voices that are trying to be heard among the top leadership,” said Jakobson.

“这反映了中国高层领导之间也有很多不同的声音希望表达出来。”雅各布森说道。

A telling sign of this internal juggling of opinions was also reflected in China‟s recent dramatic shift of posture on North Korea by strengthening its ties with Pyongyang in the aftermath of the Cheonan incident, in great contrast to China‟s strong 2006 condemnation over the nuclear test.

一个很明显的迹象也可以反映出中国高层内部不同意见之间的调和。比如在“天安舰”事件之后，中国强化了与朝鲜的关系，与2006年的强烈谴责相比，这真是一个戏剧性的转变。

“North Korea is the most divisive of foreign policy issues among the senior leadership in China,” Jakobson said.

对朝鲜的政策，是中国高层领导之间分歧最大的外交政策。雅各布森指出。