中国经济形势分析

Pinball policy政策变化如弹球

by Paul Cavey, Head of China Economics, Macquarie Securities

作者：保罗•凯维，麦格理证券中国经济研究部

Beijing’s agenda is nothing if not complex: a rise in the RMB that is enough to satisfy global critics but not derail domestic growth; domestic demand that raises imports to cut the trade surplus and create jobs without stoking inflation; inflation high enough for rebalancing without cutting real interest rates and inflating asset bubbles; and interest rates attractive enough to keep money in banks without causing hot money inflows and hurting indebted local authorities.

中国政府可谓是左支右绌：人民币升值幅度不能太小，否则没法堵住国际批评者的嘴，但同时不能破坏国内增长；必须扩大内需，以便增加进口，减少贸易盈余，创造就业机会，但又不能给通胀火上浇油；经济再平衡需要保持适度的通胀，但不能通过压低实际利率来做到这一点，否则会吹大资产泡沫；要想把钱圈在银行，那么利率就不能太低，但同时不能吸引热钱流入，不能加重地方政府的债务负担。

This was a tough act pre-crisis, and now is trickier still. Growth of 8–9%, inflation of 4–5%, and deposit rates of 5–6% is one option, but risks capital flows. They can be avoided with low deposit rates, but to prevent asset bubbles, inflation must be depressed too, which is difficult without lower GDP. Beijing struggles to meet all aims simultaneously, creating volatility in financial markets and the economy.

即使在经济危机发生前，这样的任务也算是相当棘手，何况现在。中国的一个选择是实现8–9%的经济增长率、4–5%的通胀率和5–6%的存款利率，如果要规避这样做带来的资金流风险，就需要保持较低的存款利率。但为了预防资产泡沫，就必须压低通胀率，其前提条件是GDP增长不能太快。中国政府希望面面俱到，却为金融市场和经济带来了诸多变数。

The post-crisis challenge后危机时代的挑战

Lending controls

控制放贷量

Official control of bank credit is less secure than it once was, and bank domination of total financing is less complete. The consequences of these trends will play out gradually, however, and certainly didn’t cause the spectacular lending growth of 2009. While there is some weakening at the edges, the government retains the ability to manage credit: the root of last year’s loan boom was a deliberate policy decision to ensure credit counteracted the effect of the economic downturn.

政府控制银行信贷已经不如过去那样稳妥了，而且银行在融资领域的主导地位也有所下降。但是，这些趋势的影响尚需时日才能全部显露，而且2009年放贷量激增并非由这些趋势所造成。尽管有所减弱，但是政府管理信贷的能力仍然不容小觑：去年贷款如流水，这是政府有意为之，希望通过政策调控，确保信贷能够抵消经济下滑的影响。

Lower nominal rates名义利率进一步下降

Beijing’s ability to control lending has weakened a bit, but not disappeared entirely. The bigger challenge to the framework of monetary control involves a second channel through which money leaves the banks, depositor withdrawals. The reason is simple: real interest rates have fallen.

中国政府信贷控制的能力有所下降，但并未完全消失。货币控制框架面临着一个更为严峻的挑战，这涉及到资金流出银行的第二个渠道，即储户的取款。原因很简单：实际利率有所下降。

This is partly a function of nominal rates. The 2009 surge in lending left the economy far more leveraged than before. This will mean a much bigger rise in debt repayments when interest rates go up, especially for the local governments and state-owned enterprises that were the biggest borrowers. This apparently has now become a factor for the State Council when considering whether to raise rates. But as Beijing doesn’t want to squeeze bank margins too much (in part to give them the profitability to cope with any fall-out in bad loans resulting from last year’s excesses), a ceiling on lending rates implies limits on deposit rates too.

在某种程度上而言，这是名义利率的功能所在。2009年信贷闸门大开，经济的杠杆率随之飙升。这意味着一旦加息，还贷额将大幅增加。银行最主要的借款方——地方政府和国有企业将首当其冲。显然，现在这已经成为了国务院考虑是否加息的一个因素。但由于中国政府不希望把银行的利润率压得太低（一部分原因是，银行要有足够的利润率才能应对去年信贷狂欢后可能出现的坏账），因此贷款利率设置上限即意味着同时限制存款利率。 At least during the boom years the Fed was steadily raising rates, which gave China some room to follow suit. Now, by contrast, the Fed is stuck at zero. This means that from a capital flows perspective, China’s 2.5% one-year deposit rate seems rather high, even though domestically it is very low.

至少在经济繁荣时期美联储一直在稳步提高利率，这给了中国跟进的空间。而现在形成鲜明对比的是，美联储一直在零利率附近徘徊。这意味着从资金流的角度来看，中国2.5%的一年期存款利率相对算比较高，但与中国往年比较，这是非常低的一个水平。

Such rates might be just high enough if inflation in China was to remain at the low levels recorded in the boom years, but surging perishable food prices and higher costs for inputs such as labour indicate that inflation is accelerating.

如果中国的通胀能够保持在经济繁荣期的低位水平，这样的利率可能比较适中，但是高涨的食品价格和不断攀升的投入品成本（例如劳动力成本）显示通胀正在愈演愈烈。

Lower credibility失信于民

In addition to the structural reasons that seem likely to push inflation higher, it also seems to us that Beijing is finding it harder to control inflationary expectations. The reason is the reserve of credibility that was so painfully built up by Zhu Rongji in the 1990s, and proved so useful to the authorities in controlling overheating in 2007, was run-down by the policy turnaround following the 2008 downturn.

一些结构性原因可能会进一步推高通胀，除此之外，我们认为中国政府越来越难以控制通胀预期。上世纪九十年代，朱镕基辛辛苦苦建立起政府的威信。在控制2007年的经济过热时，这种威信的力量发挥了非常大的作用。但是2008年经济下滑时期的政策转变严重挫伤了政府威信。

The consequences of this loss of credibility now seem to be at work in real estate. After the policy U-turn of 2008-09, buyers just don’t believe the government’s pledges that property prices will be kept stable.

在房地产领域，这种失信于民的后果可见一斑。2008-2009年政策出现了180°转弯后，购房者就不再相信政府稳定房价的承诺了。

Lower real deposit rates实际存款利率进一步下降

Given the changes happening in China’s economy, it seems reasonable to assume a 4-5% structural rate of inflation

through the coming years. This is not high relative to either the real rate of GDP growth or the inflationary experience of other high-growth economies. But this moderate inflation rate still promises to produce consistently negative real interest rates for China’s bank savers.

鉴于中国经济正在经历诸多变化，未来几年中国很可能出现4-5%的结构性通胀率。相对中国的实际GDP增长率或其它快速增长经济体的通胀经验，这样的通胀率并不算高，但仍会带来持续的实际负利率。

The policy choices政策选择

This is the tricky situation China finds itself in. A rise in interest rates to offset a modest structural rise in inflation would risk attracting even more liquidity into China. Keeping rates where they are, however, would mean they fall below the rate of inflation. This could mobilise China’s existing bank deposits and thus create an asset market bubble.

这就是中国目前的棘手形势。如果靠加息来抵消通胀的适度结构性增长，可能会吸引更多的流动性流入中国。但如果不这么做，又意味着利率低于通胀率。这会使存款流出银行，进而产生资产市场泡沫。

We’d guess the authorities have four big aims: 1) a rise in the RMB just big enough to satisfy global critics but not

sufficient to derail domestic growth; 2) domestic demand that raises imports enough to cut the trade surplus and meet jobs aims without producing excessive inflation; 3) inflation that is high enough for rebalancing without cutting real interest rates so much that money is chased from banks into asset markets; and 4) interest rates high enough to keep money in the banks, but low enough to both discourage hot money inflows and to save indebted local authorities from repayment problems.

我们猜测政府有四大目标：1）人民币适度升值，既要让国际批评者满意，又不能破坏国内增长；2）扩大内需，以便扩大进口，减少贸易盈余，创造就业机会，但不能带来过度通胀；3）保持适度的通胀水平，这有助于经济再平衡，但不能把实际利率压得过低，否则银行存款将流入资产市场；4）要想把钱圈在银行，那么利率就不能太低，但又不能过高，否则会吸引热钱流入，还会使负债累累的地方政府面临更重的债务负担。

While China’s authorities can initiate a crackdown on money supply growth, they would be hard-pressed to sustain it. By reducing inflation and raising the trade surplus, pressure for an appreciation of the currency will intensify. To avoid a more rapid appreciation in nominal terms, Beijing must allow loan growth to accelerate again to engineer a real

appreciation – or face protectionism. A rise in the trade surplus would be a sign to us that there is money to be made again, because the government would loosen domestic monetary policy to try to achieve some short-term economic rebalancing.

中国政府可以开始遏制货币供应量的增速，但要一直这样做就很难了。通过降低通胀、增加贸易盈余，人民币升值的压力将会越来越大。为了避免速度更快的人民币名义升值，中国政府必须再次加快贷款增速，这样才能实现人民币的实际升值，否则中国将面临贸易保护主义。贸易盈余增加对我们而言是一个赚钱的信号，因为中国政府将放松国内的货币政策，以便在短期实现某种程度的经济再平衡。

What would end this volatile approach? One option is for the government to accept lower growth, and so allow RMB appreciation that allows higher interest rates in China. A second option is for the government to engineer an innovative solution. Indeed, it seems to us that the holy grail of policymaking is to find a way of allowing higher inflation without causing an asset price bubble, so raising real interest rates for bank savers without attracting hot money.

如何终结这种政策波动？政府的一个选择是接受较慢的经济增长，允许人民币升值，进而上调利率。第二个选择是制定创新的解决办法。的确，我们认为，中国政府决策的终极目标就是找到办法，既要保持适度的通胀率，又要避免产生资产价格泡沫，在提高实际利率的同时避免吸引热钱流入。

We imagine China can find an innovative solution, but we have yet to hear much talk of a new direction. This suggests pinball policy is here for some time to come.

我们认为中国能够找到一条创新的解决办法，但是新政策方向还尚不明朗。这表明在未来一段时间，中国的政策将像弹球游戏一样充满了变数。