苏格拉底作为问题:刺猬还是狐狸?
第三讲 苏格拉底作为问题:刺猬还是狐狸?
一、 刺猬式的悲剧
公元前399年,苏格拉底被雅典城邦审判处死。柏拉图根据自己的记忆,把苏格拉底在法庭上的申辩记载了下来,是为《申辩》。读《申辩》的人,可能或多或少地感受到其中有一个令人不解的谜:苏格拉底在几次有可能妥协时都毫不把握机会,相反一往向前,三番五次地顶撞城邦,火上浇油,似乎是故意导致自己的死亡。
这种场景的意味,可以有各种解释,如斯东就看到了这一“悖理”之处,他认为苏格拉底本可以轻易争得无罪开释,却尽力树敌于陪审团。[1]而本文想要做的,是指出它构成了典型的悲剧。希腊悲剧的一个重点在于对话双方无法达成共识,结果对话中断,以至诉诸暴力,造成流血。这一切多由悲剧主角固执已见,否认对方合理性所致。苏格拉底并非不知城邦一方的合理性,据柏拉图在《克里同》中的记载,被城邦判处死刑后,苏格拉底在狱中振振有词论证的,却是无论如何不能逃避不合理的惩罚,否则就会损害城邦,而这是决不应该的,因为城邦有充分理由不被伤害!读到这些话,不禁让人疑惑当苏格拉底说这番话时可否想到,当他在法庭上挑战城邦权威时,不是已经深深地损害了城邦吗?
也许唯一的解释是:尽管苏格拉底知道城邦一方的合理性,但是他更坚信自己所坚守的“真理”,因此不肯做出丝毫让步,这就构成了“刺猬式的悲剧”。“刺猬与狐狸”这一比喻源于古希腊的一句谚语:“狐狸知道许多事,刺猬只知道一件大事。”由于柏林的拓展式运用,这一比喻在当代已进入对政治和一般文化人物性格的分析之中,其含义日趋广泛和丰富。在此,我们将把刺猬和狐狸的区分理解为:“刺猬”就是那种拥有自己的信念的人,其信念一元、简单、纯粹,被“刺猬”高度自信地认同,不惜一切代价在生活的所有场合坚持和贯彻。相反,“狐狸”是那种没有一定之见的人,但是他们又喜欢向外探讨丰富复杂的东西,不轻易接受任何“信念”,于是呈现出多元、新颖和创造之特性。
苏格拉底在《申辩》中体现出的顽固不化正是一种典型的“刺猬精神”。他对自己掌握绝对真理显示出异常的确信,而且认为真理在超出我们人类的客观世界中具有客观根基;用苏格拉底自己的话说:他可以听到神专门对他发出的声音(“灵机”);所以他在“服从神而不是服从整个世界”上毫无困难。谁敢触犯真理,这头刺猬全身的刺就会立即竖起来。这种坚强信念不仅在形态上具有“天音”的基础,而且在内容上也具有一元真理的特色。苏格拉底在各种柏拉图伦理对话录中一直穷追不舍的“众多德性是否统一”的问题背后,实际上坚信的就是:各种德性不可能是分裂的、冲突的,它们必然构成和谐统一的整体;换句话说,一位坏人不可能还在某个方面具有的优点。这种“德性统一论”与希腊传统政治伦理观是冲突的,因为大多数人相信人既可以缺乏某种德性(如正义),但同时还享有其他方面的优秀品质(如勇敢、慷慨)。亚理士多德说“苏格拉底的伦理学方法”乃是“寻找一般定义”。这也应当从确信“政治-伦理”中存在着绝对真理的角度去理解。一般定义就是“知识”,知识的特性乃是其真理性;而相信真理就意味着有真,有假,不会“对错都一样”。苏格拉底之所以在各篇伦理对话中总是追问什么是being(一般定义),就是因为对方在回答“什么是德性”的问题时几乎无一例外都在讲外在效应和属性(pathos),而非内在本质(ousia)。这不仅“肤浅”,而且会导向“既是又不是”的局面,从而最终导致否定“政治-伦理”中存在真理。相对主义者们说这是从二律背反中必然推出的逻辑结果,苏格拉底却不接受这种逻辑。他认为,当出现伦理观点的二律背反时,两种习俗观点完全有可能全都是错的,它们都没能表达出本质-理念,所以应当统统抛弃,再去寻找更为深刻的真理——这只有少数人(“专家”)才能掌握。因此,苏格拉底喜欢赫拉克立特。赫拉克立特也讲各种视角的矛盾冲
突,但是,他没有停在相对主义,他相信背后深处存在唯一真理。不错,许多东西对于人不利,对于猪或鱼好;但是人比猪或鱼正确。[2]( D13, D79.)
一个自信掌握了真理整体的人往往不屑于认真考虑对方的理由,这正是造成希腊悲剧的重要原因。如安提戈涅坚持认为自己义不容辞要埋葬亡兄。她把此责任视为神圣、唯一之事,丝毫不听国王克瑞翁一方的道理。反过来国王克瑞翁也一样,只知坚持自己“不得埋葬叛国者”的决定,也不想听安提戈涅的道理,[3]结果双方不惜押上性命贯彻各自的道理,终于同归于尽。
苏格拉底的刺猬式悲剧早就蕴涵在他的整个一生中。由于他对自己的“真正的善”的价值的信念,他处处公然驳斥他人的价值观,这自然造成了俗人的难堪。在柏拉图的各篇热闹对话中,都可以听到苏格拉底的真理与常识价值观的巨大对撞之声。细心人还可以觉出与苏格拉底对话的人因此对他生出深深的仇视、愤怒以及时时冒出的杀气。[4]( 486B, 522B) “苏格拉底的审判”只不过是这贯穿他一生的悲剧调子的自然高潮。
这绝非偶然,也许这就是哲学介入政治讨论后的必然结果,因为在哲学与日常政治间存在着巨大的落差。初看上去,苏格拉底-柏拉图的政治哲学在讨论“正义”时,只是在为日常外在的正义寻找内在根源(即灵魂的内部有序),并没触动礼乐典章、还债守约等等外部正义之责,他是“保守主义者”,或人们一般批评的“贵族统治阶级的捍卫者”。但是,作为超越的纯粹普遍性,哲学很难简单地服从法律所说的一切,遵循日常的价值观。如苏格拉底就反对“帮助朋友,伤害敌人”的希腊习俗正义观。而且,他的“哲学王制”也不可能捍卫血缘君主制,虽然苏格拉底的对手误以为他在捍卫一般君主名分正义观。[4](471A)还有,苏格拉底在被判处死刑时说:如果死亡是来到一个更好的地方,可以继续讨论价值知识的真伪,那还有比这更好的事情吗?这话很高尚,但这完全违反了希腊的价值观。死比活着好,遭受不正义比干不正义好,这在某种宗教信仰中可能很自然,但是这不是希腊信念。价值的彻底重估必然导向彻底破坏此世物质利益的价值,从而淘空日常政治“外在正义”的基础。
有些学者因此批判苏格拉底:不应该得理不饶人,不应当只坚持自己的立场。用哲学否定政治是幼稚的。政治中,即使自己有充分道理,在程序正义上也不应该固执一方的合理性而否认真正对话的必要,因为这不能真正解题。斯特劳斯派认为,具有政治审慎德性的哲学家应该给习俗洞穴、宗教、意见、高贵谎言、激情、欲望等等以一定的地位。应该考虑到各方——比如哲学与城邦,政治与个人——理由的合理性。与此相似,后期罗尔斯干脆直截了当地建议不要在政治建构中引入“真理”的话语,不要引入哲学-宗教的强烈价值信念,这样才能避开宗教战争等政治悲剧。(参看罗尔斯:《政治自由主义》)
二、 狐狸式的悲剧
苏格拉底的悲剧是典型的“刺猬式的悲剧”,是哲学与政治冲突的结果。然而这就是全部的故事吗?似乎又不是。从许多线索看,一个几乎相反的故事在柏拉图笔下也同样地展开了:苏格拉底的悲剧与其说是他如刺猬所致,不如说是他如狐狸所致。“刺猬”具有自己正面、肯定、建设性的信念,而“狐狸”只是否定,无确定性信念,没有自己的主张,张扬的只是孜孜不倦的批判精神,永不止息的探索精神。狐狸的话语方式与刺猬的完全不同;刺猬好为人师,把自己一整套教条强加予人,狐狸却见招拆招,不提出自己的观点,专门审查对方的观点,并且一一驳倒,以专门动摇别人的信念为已任。几乎每篇“苏格拉底对话”都是从头开始,互不重复,比喻新鲜且经常变换,相互并不追求前后对应。而且每次经过眼花缭乱的辩驳后,也并无任何建设性结果提出。苏格拉底的“自治无知”是认真的。他经常问的问题“德性能教吗?”是其真问题。他从未真正传道授业解惑,只不过装疯卖傻(“反讽”的原意)把别人的拙劣教育方法驳倒,最终结论无一例外都是共同陷入困惑绝望的无解(aporia)之中。
“哲学”可以有两种完全不同的含义,但都可能对政治构成威胁。首先,哲学一般被理解为形而上学,由于形而上学的超巨大视野,哲学可能威胁日常政治。然而哲学也可以被理解为是“批判精神”,这就是狐狸类型的哲学,它对一切怀疑——甚至对形而上学也怀疑,所以这种“哲学”更可能威胁日常政治。苏格拉底在“德尔菲事件”之后自我意识到的哲学使命,正是这种在自己和他人身上推行此种毁灭性的自我审查的批判哲学。
二十世纪的苏格拉底研究,由于弗拉斯托的强调,唤起人们对柏拉图的“苏格拉底对话录”中实际上隐藏着两种截然不同的哲学的注意。过去的学者虽然也感到柏拉图思想中有不和谐的声音,但多是视为正常的“发展”;但弗拉斯托断言这是根本性对立,并由此分析出历史上确实存在着一个“苏格拉底”,他的哲学与柏拉图的哲学完全不同![5](类似强调苏格拉底与柏拉图思想对立的现代哲学家还可以看德里达,科尔伯格,波普尔等人的观点。)弗拉斯托总结出十大不同,如他们在讨论的领域、是否关心数学、是否有关于灵魂的形而上学理论、是否有理念论、对待宗教的态度、道德心理学等方面都相背甚极。尤其第十个不同:苏格拉底使用的是一种独特的“归谬反驳”(elenchus)方法论,它被用来在对话中审查别人的观点,通过显示出对方的看法与前提矛盾而将其驳倒。这种方法是“成熟的柏拉图”从来不曾使用的。[6]我们不妨说这位苏格拉底就是作为狐狸的苏格拉底,而狐狸自有“狐狸式的悲剧”。
首先,作为狐狸的苏格拉底把破除人的自满当成自己的唯一使命。但是,自满是道德权威的一个依据(想想法利赛人的道德自满)。无论是传统的德性模范,还是民主制下的新专家,都由于自信而自满。日常习俗道德权威正是建立在对自己的信念充分自满的基础上。摧毁了这种自信自满,岂不是就摧毁了日常道德?《理想国》开篇时出场的代表日常道德的正义老人昔法劳斯就对自己的道德及其神学基础十分自满。老人历经沧桑,德高望重,充满长者风范;他相信自己应该信守道德,对自己道德的一生感到满意。苏格拉底却用疑问反驳方法挑战这种自满,使其陷入困境。好在老人被反驳后似乎没有受到影响,起身继续去进行传统的宗教祭仪。但是在其他对话中,陷入疑惑和恼怒的人就未必能有如此“功力”了。《拉克斯》中苏格拉底先后把两位“勇敢专家”驳倒;《高尔吉亚》和《普罗泰戈拉》中他又戳穿了智术师专家的自信。《申辩》里苏格拉底总结自己的使命就是把所有以“专家之知识”著称的人挑下马来;同时又拒绝提供“真知识”替代品。通过各篇对话,可以总结出苏格拉底的几个一以贯之的基本哲学信念:
A.道德是知识——真正意义上的知识;
B.所有人都没有这样的知识——只有神才有;
C.A与B应当让所有人都知道——启蒙以治疗人的灵魂。
从这三个命题的结合中能推出什么?只能是社会道德不可能存在。[7](p138)(相比之下,不承认苏格拉底的强知识论伦理学前提的宗教信徒就不会陷入这样的困境,因为对于信仰宗教的人,道德并不是知识,而是神的命令;从而,即使在认识论上得出否定性结果,也不会影响在道德上跟着神的命令走)天地人神或习俗是我们唯一能够依靠的道德资源。成熟的政治家的大敌据说不是贪官污吏,而是刺穿一切谎言包括高贵谎言的哲学家。任何终极性的追求都可能导向彻底绝望;将生活本质深处的悲剧性揭穿给大众看的人是不负责任的。哲学不是斩钉截铁地否认现存世界的价值,它对此的态度在本质上是讨论的,开放的;可政治本质上是行动,要求立即的确定结果。如果将政治视为确定的价值前提和信念拿到反思的活力下审查讨论,那肯定会动摇政治。当然,苏格拉底的本意也许是在打扫地基(purgative),为更高的真理做准备;但是大多数人打扫完地基后,并不能跟着他“上升”或“回忆”或“跳跃”到严格的“知识”层面,那就最终归于虚无主义。事实上,苏格拉底的众多信徒中有的变成了怀疑论(所谓“中期学园派”),有的彻底放弃真理追求,厌恶讨论(见《菲多》),有的转向“马术”(见《巴门尼德》)。
所以,公众认为苏格拉底就是智者,把坏的说成是好的,败坏青年。必须处死这样的颠覆者。阿里斯托芬的喜剧《云》早就这么描写苏格拉底。这可能代表着城邦对苏格拉底的一般看法。[8](p102)在这部喜剧的结尾,受到“苏格拉底”伤害的城邦公民放火烧毁了苏格拉底的“思想所”,苏格拉底似乎也葬身火海。纽斯邦说这是阿里斯托芬各部喜剧中结尾最为残酷的;其血腥之气,令人惊讶。[8](p109)(这让人想到在《卡拉马佐夫兄弟》中的大法官对再一次来到人间的耶稣说的话:为了政治,为了民众,我必须打压你。)换句话说,在这部看似热闹的喜剧中,苏格拉底的狐狸式悲剧已经险象毕露。
进一步讲,不仅日常政治与狐狸处于紧张之中,而且“理想政治”之刺猬也可能与狐狸处于紧张之中。如果说按照弗拉斯托、波普尔等人的看法,苏格拉底的哲学与柏拉图哲学实际上是截然对立的,那么,二人之间难道只会发生理论上的冲突,而不蕴涵血腥杀气的悲剧成分吗?让我们问得更为直白一些:在柏拉图建设性的、独断的、绝对真理为基础的“理想国”中,首先要规定的可能就是天下有道则庶人不议;规定在国家教育方案中不得让年青人拥有接触导向价值相对主义的各种说法的“言论自由”;规定感性训练而非“模仿坏人推理”的辩驳(Elenchus)为教化原则。如此,则卫国者难道不会对不顾国法而依然坚持以主观性质疑权威的人处以流放——乃至死刑吗?学生难道要杀老师吗?
[参考文献]
[1]斯东.苏格拉底的审判[M].北京: 三联书店,1998. 14,15章.
[2]Heraclits. The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,1931.
[3] Mary Whitlock Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies[M], Cambridge University Press, 1991, Chapter 4.
[4] Plato. Gorgias [M],New York:Arno Press,1973.
[5] W. J. Prior, Introduction[A], W. J. Prior. Socrates: Critical Assessments[C], New York: Routledge, 1996, p.xiii-xv.
[6] G. Vlastos, Socrates[A], W. J. Prior. Socrates: Critical Assessments[C], New York: Routledge, 1996, p.143.
[7] 弗拉斯托. 苏格拉底的悖论[A]. 刘小枫等. 苏格拉底问题[C]. 北京: 华夏出版社,2005. p138.
[8] M. Nussbaum. Aristophanes and Socrates on Learning Practical Wisdom[A], W. J. Prior. Socrates: Critical Assessments[C], New York: Routledge, 1996.
[9] 汪子嵩等. 希腊哲学史 (第2卷)[M]. 北京: 人民出版社, 1993. p. 627.
附录:以赛亚·柏林:《刺猬与狐狸》(节选)
The Hedgehog and the Fox - (excerpt)
Isaiah Berlin
There is a line among the fragments of the Greek poet Archilochus which says: 'The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing'. Scholars have differed about the correct interpretation of these dark words, which may mean no more than that the fox, for all his cunning, is defeated by the hedgehog's one defense. But, taken figuratively, the words can be made to yield a sense in which they mark one of the deepest differences which divide writers and thinkers, and, it may be, human beings in general. For there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to a single central vision, one system less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think and feel-a single, universal, organizing
principle in terms of which alone all that they are and say has significance-and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for some psychological or physiological cause, related by no moral or aesthetic principle; these last lead lives, perform acts, and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather than centripetal, their thought is scattered or diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects for what they are in themselves, without consciously or unconsciously, seeking to fit them into, or exclude them from, any one unchanging, all-embracing, sometimes self-contradictory and incomplete, at times fanatical, unitary inner vision. The first kind of intellectual and artistic personality belongs to the hedgehogs, the second to the foxes; and without insisting on a rigid classification, we may, without too much fear of contradiction, say that, in this sense, Dante belongs to the first category, Shakespeare to the second; Plato, Lucretius, Pascal, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche, Ibsen, Proust are, in varying degrees, hedgehogs; Herodotus, Aristotle, Montaigne, Erasmus, Molière, Goethe, Pushkin, Balzak, Joyce are foxes.
Of course, like all over-simple classifications of this type, the dichotomy becomes, if pressed, artificial, scholastic, and ultimately absurd. But if it is not an aid to serious criticism, neither should it be rejected as being merely superficial or frivolous; like all distinctions which embody any degree of truth, it offers a point of view from which to look and compare, a starting-point for genuine investigation. Thus we have no doubt about the violence of the contrast between Pushkin and Dostoevsky; and Dostoevsky's celebrated speech about Pushkin has, for all its eloquence and depth of feeling, seldom been considered by any perceptive reader to cast light on the genius of Pushkin, but rather on that of Dostoevsky himself, precisely because it perversely represents Pushkin-an arch-fox, the greatest in the nineteenth century-as a being similar to Dostoevsky who is nothing if not a hedgehog; and thereby transforms, indeed distorts, Pushkin into a dedicated prophet, a bearer of a single, universal message which was indeed the centre of Dostoevsky's own universe, but exceedingly remote from the many varied provinces of Pushkin's protean genius. Indeed, it would not be absurd to say that Russian literature is spanned by these gigantic figures-at one pole Pushkin, at the other Dostoevsky; and that the characteristics of the other Russian writers can, by those who find it useful or enjoyable to ask that kind of question, to some degree be determined in relation to these great opposites. To ask of Gogol', Turgenev, Chekhov, Blok how they stand in relation to Pushkin and to Dostoevsky leads-or, at any rate, has lead-to fruitful and illuminating criticism. But when we come to Count Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy, and ask this of him - ask whether he belongs to the first category or the second, whether he is a monist or a pluralist, whether his vision is of one or of many, whether he is of a single substance or compounded of heterogeneous elements, there is no clear or immediate answer. The question does not, somehow, seem wholly appropriate; it seems to breed more darkness than it dispels. Yet it is not lack of information that makes us pause: Tolstoy has told us more about himself and his views and attitudes than any other Russian, more, almost than any other European writer; nor can his art be called obscure in any normal sense; his universe has no dark corners, his stories are luminous with the light of day; he has explained them and himself, and argued about them and the methods by which they are constructed, more articulately and with greater force and sanity and articulately and with greater force and sanity and lucidity than any other writer. Is he a fox or a hedgehog? What are we to say? Why is the answer so curiously difficult to find? Does he resemble Shakespeare or Pushkin more than Dante or Dostoevsky? Or is he wholly unlike either, and is the
question therefore unanswerable because it is absurd? What is the mysterious obstacle with which our inquiry seems faced?
I do not propose in this essay to formulate a reply to this question, since this would involve nothing less than a critical examination of the art and thought of Tolstoy as a whole. I shall confine myself to suggesting that the difficulty may be, at least in part, due to the fact that Tolstoy was himself not unaware of the problem, and did his best to falsify the answer. The hypothesis I wish to offer is that Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog; that his gifts and achievement are one thing, and his beliefs, and consequently his interpretation of his own achievement, another; and that consequently his ideals have led him, and those whom his genius for persuasion has taken in, into a systematic misinterpretation of what he and others were doing or should be doing. No one can complain that he has left his readers in any doubt as to what he thought about this topic: his views on this subject permeate all this topic: his views on this subject permeate all his discursive writings-diaries, recorded obiter dicta, autobiographical essays and stories, social and religious tracts, literary criticism, letters to private and public correspondents. But this conflict between what he was and what he believed emerges nowhere so clearly as in his view of history to which some of his most brilliant and most paradoxical pages are devoted. This essay is an attempt to deal with his historical doctrines, and to consider both his motives for holding the views he holds and some of their probable sources. In short, it is an attempt to take Tolstoy's attitude to history as seriously as he himself meant his readers to take it, although for a somewhat different reason-for the light it casts on a single man of genius rather than on the fate of all mankind.