进出口贸易外文翻译文献

进出口贸易外文翻译文献

(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)

China’s Competitive Performance: A Threat To East Asian Manufactured Exports?

There is growing concern in Southeast and East Asia about the competitive

threat posed by China’s burgeoning exports, exacerbated by its accession to the

WTO. The threat is not confined to labor-intensive products but spans the whole

technological and skill range. At the same time, China is rapidly raising its

imports from the region, and it is not clear whether its burgeoning exports will

damage its neighbors. We examine the dimensions of China’s competitive threat

in the 1990s, benchmarking competitive performance by technology and market,

and finds that market share losses are so far mainly in low technology products,

with Japan being the most vulnerable market. We analyze market share changes

and highlight product groups that are directly or indirectly exposed to a

competitive threat. We examine intra-regional trade and find that China and its

neighbors are raising high technology exports in tandem: the nature of the

international production systems involved lead to complementarily rather than

confrontation. China is thus acting as an engine of export growth for its neighbors

in terms of direct trade. However, this will change as China moves up the value

chain and takes on the activities that have driven East Asian export growth.

Introduction

Concern about China’s competitive threat is widespread (in developed

economies like US as well as developing ones like Mexico), but is strongest in

East and Southeast Asia. China’s burgeoning exports–backed by cheap and

productive labor, a large stock of technical manpower, huge and diversified

industrial sector, attractiveness to foreign investors, pragmatic use of industrial

policy, and, now, freer access to world markets under WTO – lead to apocalyptic

visions of export losses.2 China is most threatening to neighbors that rely

primarily on low wages for their export advantage. However, as it upgrades its

export structure, the more advanced economies (Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea

and Taiwan) also fear for their competitiveness. The current hollowing out of

their low-end manufacturing may soon extend to complex production, design,

development and related services. Domestic markets are also threatened by China,

but so far most attention seems to have been on exports.

Offsetting this threat are the promise of the giant Chinese market (WTO

accession is only one of several initiatives to liberalize regional trade) and the

potential for collaboration with it in exporting to the rest of the world. Trade

within the East Asian region is flourishing. China is a growing importer from the

region of natural resources that it does not possess. It is also raisin g imports of

manufactured products. Its advanced neighbors are selling it sophisticated

consumer and producer goods, and using it as a base for processing exports to

third countries. The multinational companies (MNCs) that now account for

around half of Chinese exports (and far more of its high technology exports,

UNCTAD,2002) are incorporating China into production systems spanning the

region (‘fragmentation’ and ‘segmentation’ are used to describe this

phenomenon3), so promoting considerable intra-firm trade with other regional

bases. China’s own enterprises are likely to specialize with respect to regional

counterparts and so raise intra-industry trade in differentiated products. Perhaps

worryingly for competitors in other regions, such integration can lead China to

complement regional competitiveness as a whole, rather than substitute its

exports for those of its neighbors.

It is difficult to assess, however, whether complementarily between China

and the regional economies will fully offset its competitive threat. The dynamics

and complexity of the interactions make it impossible to quantify the outcome,

even to predict broad directions. The basic issue is whether China’s higher wage

neighbors can move into more advanced export activities or functions rapidly

enough to permit continued export expansion. If they can, they can continue with

export-led growth. If they cannot, they will suffer export deceleration and/or a

shift in specialization towards primary products or slow-growing segments of

manufactured exports. The outcome, in other words, will depend on the relative

growth of technological and other capabilities in Chinese and regional enterprises,

with the former having such advantages as lower wages, larger scale economies,

greater industrial depth, pools of technical skill and a proactive government.

However, as East Asian countries differ widely in these factors (Lall, 2001), they

face different kinds and intensity of competitive threat. The nature of the threat

depends, moreover, on the organization of the production and marketing system:

independent local firms are likely to compete more directly than affiliates of the

same MNC spread over different countries in an integrated system.

This paper does not try to measure China’s competitive threat or its effects,

but to map relative export performance in the 1990s by technology and

destination and so assess where the threat appears most intense. We focus on

major East Asian exporters5 and on exports to third markets, but we also analyses

complementarities between China and East Asia, particularly in electronics, the

region’s largest export and the one where MNC systems dominate. As the 1990s

predate China’s WTO accession, we do not go into the implications of this

accession; however, the analysis of competitive trends has implications for the

evolution of future trade by the region as liberalization grows.

Background on Chinese export performance

Chinese manufactured exports grew by 16.9% per annum over 1990-2000,

compared to 6.4% for the world, 12.0% for all developing countries and 10.3%

for the rest of East Asia. Its share of world manufactured exports rose from 1.7%

to 4.4% over the decade and continued rising rapidly. 6 Thus, by 2002 China

accounted for 5.1% of world merchandise exports; it was then the fifth largest

exporter (after USA, Germany, Japan and France, and ahead of the UK). China’s

share of developing world manufactured exports rose from 11% to 20% over the

1990s and of the East Asian region excluding China from 18.7% to 41.8%. Its

export gains (see below) spanned the entire technological spectrum, and were

most dynamic in the complex end of the range, in products that have recently

driven the export growth of the rest of East Asia.

This export surge is likely to be sustained for some time to come. China has

‘spare capacity’ in that its per capita exports are still relatively small,7 wages are

much lower than in its main neighbors and it has large reserves of cheap and

disciplined labor (though drawing it into exports will involve the cost of building

links with the interior).8 More importantly, its advantages are not static (confined

to cheap labor); they are upgrading rapidly. China is investing heavily in

technology and advanced skills; for example, the share of the relevant age group

enrolled in tertiary education rose from 9 percent in 1997 to 13 percent in 2000

(UNESCO website). It is exploiting the scale offered by its giant market to

become competitive in capital-intensive activities beyond the reach of many

neighbors. It is using its diverse industrial base to deepen local content. It is

drawing in export-oriented FDI at an impressive rate, using its market attractions

to induce investors to raise local R&D and linkages; till now it has been able to

impose performance requirements of the type soon to be banned under WTO

rules.

WTO accession may constrain China’s ability to use industrial policy (Nolan,

2001) but it will also open up new export opportunities, particularly in textiles

and garments.9 Accession may also enhance its domestic competitiveness: it will

improve the investment climate for FDI, make imported inputs cheaper (for

enterprises outside special export regimes) and induce faster restructuring of

domestic enterprises (Ianchovichinaetal, 2003, and Lemoyne and Unal-Kesenci,

2002).

Market share changes in major developed country markets

We analyze market shares of China and its neighbors in three major markets:

Japan, the US and West Europe, according to technology categories (Annex Table

1). In terms of value, the most important market for China in 2000 is the US ($49

billion), followed by Japan ($36 billion) and West Europe ($38 billion). However,

the rest of the world is almost as large a destination for Chinese exports as these

together ($106 billion in 2000) and within this the rest of East Asia is larger than

any major OECD market by itself ($74.6 billion).

The competitive position of each country can be analyzed in terms of the

market share in 1990 and 2000 and the change over the decade. The annex table

shows the following:

Total manufactured exports: China does best in Japan, followed at some

distance by the US. In common with most neighbors, its market share gain is

weakest in West Europe. Korea loses market shares in both Japan and US, while

Taiwan loses only in the US. Hong Kong’s loses market shares in all markets,

particularly in the US and Japan. Like Taiwan, Singapore loses only in the US.

The new Tigers gain share in all markets. With the exception of Indonesia, with a

rather tepid performance, the others all gain most share in the Japanese market.

Resource based products: China again leads the region in terms of market share

increases, with a pattern similar to that for total exports. However, Korea has a

large gain in Japan, in contrast to Taiwan and Singapore, which lose shares; the

latter two also lose in the US. Thailand is a big gainer in Japan while Indonesia

and the Philippines lose out in the US. Low technology products: China’s massive

market share gains are again concentrated in Japan. The four mature Tigers

generally suffer losses in market share, but Singapore sees an increase in

Japanese market share. The best overall performance among the new Tigers is by

Indonesia.

Medium technology products: While the Chinese pattern of success recurs,

the new Tigers make significant gains in Japan and Korea incurs a significant loss.

Taiwan and Singapore suffer losses in the US market. High technology exports:

Taiwan again diverges from Korea in its performance in Japan, the former

showing the second largest gain in the group (after China) and the latter the

largest loss. In the US market, the situation is reversed, with Singapore joining

Taiwan in losing market shares. Among the new Tigers, Malaysia and the

Philippines are the big gainers in Japan, but the other two also benefit

significantly. The Philippines is the second largest winner in the group in the US

market. In sum, China’s main market share gains in the developed world are

concentrated in Japan (though the US accounts for a larger dollar value of export

growth). This is also true of its neighbors with the exceptions of Korea and

Indonesia (Hong Kong was an all-round loser). To the extent that we can interpret

market share changes to be causally related to China’s export surge, it would seem that the mature Tigers suffered the

most from Chinese competition. The largest such loss is in low technology

products, which is to be expected, but this not take into account the growth of LT

exports by Korea and Taiwan to China. The relatively low gains by the

lower-income new Tigers in LT may also reflect the impact of Chinese

competition – without the offsetting increase in exports of intermediates to China.

Conclusions

China’s export surge has raised grave concerns in the region. While some of

the apocalyptic predictions may have been overdone, it is certainly possible that

rapid export growth by such a massive entrant will adversely affects export

growth in its neighbors. As this analysis shows,however, the outcome is complex.

For a start, the rise in China’s exports is matched by that in its imports – within

the region its import growth outpaces its export growth. With appropriate

restructuring of activities to match new competitive needs, its neighbors should

be able to maintain high rates of export growth.

There are two main drivers of regional exports to China. The first is to meet

its burgeoning demand for imported products: primary products and

resource-based manufactures that it cannot produce capital goods and

intermediates for domestic -oriented production and more sophisticated consumer

goods than its industry can currently provide. The second is to meet the needs of

its export industries. This has two components: ‘processing’ activity in special

economic zones that use imported inputs for export activities, and other exporters

that also need imports. Processing activity is increasingly organized as part of

integrated production systems, particularly its high technology segments, though

some domestic oriented industries are also being plugged into this system as they realize scale and learning economies and become globally competitive. Both drivers are likely to continue into the foreseeable future, though their composition will change as Chinese and regional capabilities develop.

中国竞争力的表现：是对东亚制成品出口的威胁吗？

越来越多的东南亚和东亚地区关注中国出口的迅速增长所带来的竞争威胁，中国加入WTO后，更加剧了这种情况。这种威胁并不局限于劳动密集型产品，而是跨越整个技术和技能范围的产品，同时，中国正在迅速提高其在东南亚和东亚的进口，目前尚不清楚其是否其蓬勃发展的出口将是否损害其邻国的利益，本文研究了中国20世纪90年代中国竞争威胁的大小，市场竞争力表现的基准是技术和市场份额，研究发现，

发现市场份额的损失迄今为止主要在低技术产品，日本是其最脆弱的市场。我们分析了市场份额的变化，直接或间接地突出了产品集群的竞争威胁。区域内贸易的研究表明，中国和其邻国同步提高了高技术产品的出口，参与国际生产系统的性质导致的是互补性，而不是对抗。因此，在直接贸易条件下，中国在出口增长方面是其邻国的领头人，但是，这将改变中国价值链的移动，带动东亚出口的迅速增长，

引言

中国竞争威胁论的担心是普遍存在的，（像发达国家中的美国和发展中国家的墨西哥等）作为东亚和南亚最大的出口国，中国的新兴出口凭借廉价的劳动生产力，大量的人力技术存量，巨大的和多元化的工业部门，吸引外国投资，以及优惠的产业政策，如今，加入WTO后，中国更加自由的进入国际市场，导致了出口损失末日的严重观点。中国依靠低工资的出口优势造成了对邻国的最大威胁。中国的出口结构升级以后，更多的发达经济体（新加坡，香港，南韩和台湾）也会担忧其强大的竞争力，当前其低端工业制成的漏洞将很快由其他复杂生产、设计和发展的产品以及相关的服务产业所填充。各个国家的国内市场也受到中国的威胁，但目前为止，主要关注的还是在出口方面。

弱化这种威胁论的是中国政府的承诺(加入WTO只是区域贸易自由化的若干举措之一)，和出口到世界各地的潜在合作。中国与东亚地区的贸易正在蓬勃发展，在这些地区进口其不具备自然资源的速度在快速

增长。工业制成品的进口也在上升，发达的邻国向其销售消费制成品和生产制成品，并利用其作为向第三国产品出口的加工基地。多国公司（跨国公司），现在占到中国出口的一半（目前主要是高技术产品的出口，UNCTAD,2002）,不断融入中国生产系统的方方面面，（用'分裂'和'分割'是用来描述这种现象）,更好地促进了与其他区域企业之间的贸易。中国的国有企业有可能专业化同业生产，以此提高同业差异化产品的贸易。与其担心在其他地区的竞争对手，这种整合反而会导致中国以配合整个区域的竞争力，而不是替代其邻国的出口。

但是，中国和各区域经济体的互补性是否能完全抵消其竞争威胁，这是难以估计的。动态性和复杂性的相互作用使其无法量化这个结果，我们甚至可以预知大方向。这里的基本问题是，中国高工资的邻国是否带来更先进的技术活动，而且能够迅地速继续扩大出口额。如果能，那么可以继续出口引致的经济增长，否则他们将受到出口减速和/或在对初级产品或工业制成品出口增长缓慢的部分进行专业化转变。换言之，产出将取决于技术和能力，中国和其他地区企业的相对增长，前者优势有工资较低，规模效益较大，产业深度更广，技术技能集群更大，以及一个积极的政府。然而，东亚国家在这些因素方面的差异很大，(Lall, 2001),他们面对着不同种类和密集度的竞争威胁。威胁的性质更多地体现在产品组织和营销系统，独立的当地企业可能比一体化系统中遍布不同国家的相同跨国公司分支机构的竞争更加直接。

本文并不试图衡量中国的竞争威胁或其影响力，而是衡量上世纪90年代由技术和目的评估找出相关产品出口竞争威胁最激烈的地方。我们专注于东亚的主要出口国和第三市场的出口，我们还分析了中国和东亚地区之间的互补性，特别是在电子产品方面，该地区是最大的出口方，而且跨国公司系统占主导地位。早在中国未进入WTO的90年代，我们没有阻止其进入的影响力，竞争力趋势的研究表明其对区域自由化增长引起的未来贸易变革是有影响的。

中国出口结构表现的背景

中国工业制成品年出口增长率超过1990-2000的16.9%，超出世界平均水平的6.4%,超过其余东亚发展中国家的10.3%，近几年中国的国际工业制成品的份额从1.7%上升到4.4%，并且在迅速增长，因此，到2002年中国占世界商品出口的5.1％; 是第五大出口国（仅次于美国，德国，日本和法国，并领先于英国），中国在发展中国家的工业制成品出口份额从20世纪90年代的11％上升到20％，东亚地区除中国以外，从18.7％上升到41.8％。中国出口的增长跨越了整个技术领域，在复杂产品以及目前对其余东亚国家的出口增长起主导作用的产品范围内最具影响。

出口激增可能需要一段时间来实现，中国的“闲臵能力”导致人均资本出口额仍旧相对较小，工资比主要邻国要低，廉价的规范化的劳动量储存较大(虽然它们拉动了出口，但是带来了建立内部联动机制的成