养老保险外文翻译文献
养老保险外文翻译文献
(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)
原文:
Reintroducing Intergenerational Equilibrium: Key Concepts
behind the New Polish Pension System
Abstract
Poland adopted a new pension system in 1999. This new pension system allows Poland to reduce pension expenditure (as a percent of GDP), instead of increasing it as is projected for the majority of other OECD countries. This paper presents the conceptual background of the new system design. The new system’s long -term bjective is to ensure intergenerational equilibrium irrespective of the demographic situation. This requires stabilisation of the share of GDP allocated to the entire retired
generation. Traditional pension systems aim, instead, at stabilisation of the share of GDP per retiree. The change in demographic structure observed over the past for a couple of decades and this historic attempt to stabilise the share of GDP per retiree led to severe fiscal problems and negative externalities for growth, as observed in numerous countries. Many countries have tried to reform their pension systems in different ways to try to resolve the issue of these ever-increasing costs. Although the Polish reform uses a number of techniques applied elsewhere, its design differs from the typical approaches – and the lessons and results are promising for all OECD countries. This paper presents the theoretical and practical application of this alternative approach and as such, the key features of the new Polish pension system design.
Introduction
Demographic transition together with myopic policies has caused severe problems in the area of pensions in many countries around the world. Elements of traditional pension systems’ design include a weak link of benefits to contributions and the lack of control over costs of the system. Inclusion of these elements in the pension system design led to the explosion of costs, caused negative externalities for growth and contributed to persistently high unemployment. As such, the quest for pension reform is now on the top of policy agendas around the world, and especially in Europe. However, very few countries have been able to introduce fundamental reforms in the area of pensions to this time. In this case, the definition of reform is crucial. For the purposes of this paper, “reform” means changing t he system in order to remove tructural inefficiencies – and not just playing at the margins with contribution rates a nd retirement ages to adjust the system’s parameters for short-term fiscal and political reasons.Traditional pension systems have proven to be inefficient in providing societies with social security. At
the same time attempts to cure these systems are hampered by a lack of consensus on what could replace the traditional system. Discussions on this issue involve confusion stemming from the ideological context of the discussion participants, as well as from overuse of such concepts as “pay-as-you-go” versus “funding”, or “public” versus “private”, while at the same time ignoring a number of important economic issues.
Furthermore, economists have traditionally ignored pensions. Designing and running pension systems was left to non-economists, who were not extensively concerned with how to finance pensions in the long-term or with how to counteract these pension systems’ negative externalities. The new Polish pension system belongs to very small number of successful attempts to apply modern thinking in the area of pensions. This does not mean – as some may assume – giving up social security goals. Rather, the key idea was to give up the inefficient methods of delivering social security in order to save its goals and principles.
This paper consists of two parts. The first focuses on a discussion of general issues that need to be addressed when designing a pension system. These issues are presented in a way that goes beyond the traditional way of thinking on pensions. In regards to this second part of the paper, it is important to point out that most countries in the current EU member states and candidate countries have pension systems that are essentially the same at the basic policy level. As such, the solutions in one member state or candidate country can be expected to be the same. Like European states such as France, Germany, Italy, the Czech Republic, Hungary and other European states, Poland and Sweden over the past decades and until the late 1990’s developed inefficient, costly pension systems. As such, in part two of the paper we shall examine how Poland has now successfully implemented the approach presented in the first part of the paper, and created a fundamentally strong and neutral pension system.
Selected general issues
Pension system design has to take into account a number of issues. Their full presentation and discussion goes beyond the scope of this paper This paper presents only a list of the issues for consideration and the most important observations. The pension system: externalities versus neutrality The description of a pension system depends strongly on both the aggregated and individual viewpoint. From the aggregated perspective, the pension system is a way of dividing current GDP between a part kept by the working generation and a part allocated to the retired generation. From the individual perspective, the pension system is a way of income allocation over a person’s life cycle. The above holds irrespective to the technical method applied or the ideological viewpoint. The pension system – as defined above – is not necessarily pay-as-you-go or funded. Such features stem from technical elements additionally applied on the top of the pension system, rather than from the system itself. If the pension system design assumes anonymous participation and a substantial scale of redistribution then we usually call this system pay-as-you-go. If the pension system design uses financial markets, then we usually call it funded. However, these two typically used concepts do not exhaust all possible combinations of anonymous versus individualised participation and financial versus non-financial pension system design techniques used. The dualistic pay-as-you-go versus funded approach leaves aside the combination of individual participation in a system that does not use financial markets. This approach also neglects the fact that using financial markets means investment (pension portfolio consists of private equities) or deferring taxes (pension portfolio consists of government bonds), which is obviously not the same. Adding redistribution or financial markets to the pension system generates externalities. These externalities can be positive and negative. Redistribution within the pension system can generate positive externalities if the system is
inexpensive, namely the part of GDP allocated to the retired generation is not large. If the redistribution is large, then it generates negative externalities, such as contributing to persistently high unemployment and weak growth. Using financial markets causes positive externalities for growth if the pension system spends contribution money on investment. If the contributions are spent on government debt they may lead to negative externalities similar to those of large redistributive system, namely more tax distortions. This can happen if the rate of return on government debt is persistently above the rate of GDP growth. There exists yet another option, namely to bring the pension system as close toeconomic neutrality as possible. This option requires, among other things, combining individual participation in the system with dividing GDP between generations based on real economy developments, such as has been done in Poland and Sweden.
Demographic structure: consequences of the change .Irrespective of the pension system design technique used, the pension system exchanges a right of the retired generation for a part of the product of the working generation. The exchange can be organised in various ways and also the rights can be expressed in various ways. In particular, the rights can be either traded in the financial markets, or defined in relation to some economic variables, or just based on political promise. In all of these cases there is a kind of market for pension rights. The working generation finances contributions in order to purchase the rights; the retired generation sells the rights in order to get a part of the product of the working generation. The various types of pension systems create an institutional framework for this market.
Key features of the new Polish pension system
The new Polish pension system design is a good example of applying the above described way of thinking in practice. The system named
“Security through Diversity” started on 1 January 1999. It entirely replaced previous regulations on oldage pensions for majority of working population. Designing the new system from scratch provided the unique opportunity to avoid complicating the system. Instead, the new system design is simple and transparent. The main goal was to design a system that can be neutral or at least close to neutrality for economic growth irrespective of population ageing. The design of the new system does not copy any other pension system existing elsewhere. Strong similarity can be found only to the new Swedish pension system based on similar principles and started on the same day.16 At the same time, within this general framework the new Polish system uses a number of technical concepts developed in other countries. This brief presentation of the new Polish pension system focuses on the general economic design of the system, while leaving aside most technical details.
The following bullets help in grasping the essence of the concept of the new Polish system design.
Focusing on the universal part of the pension system;
Separation of the old-age part of social security from the non-old-age parts of social security ; and segmenting the flows of revenue; Termination of the part of the previous system;
Creation of a new pension system, entirely based on individual accounts; Accrual accounting within the system;
Splitting each person’s OA contributions between two accounts (first account –
NDC, second account – FDC);
Annuitisation of account values at the moment of retirement;
Minimum pension supplement on the top of both annuities if their sum is below
certain level (financed out of the state budget).
It should be strongly stressed that both accounts are annuitised at the same moment and play exactly the same role within social security. In particular there is no such element of the system as a “basic state pension”. Social redistribution exists but it has been moved out from the pension system. The sole role of the pension system is providing working generation with an efficient method of income allocation over their life cycle. The contribution rate for the entire social security system has not changed. However workers’ salaries were “grossed up” in order to introduce to them the idea that they pay part of the contribution and to build their awareness of the overall cost of the pension system. As such, since 1 January 1999 both workers and employers share the cost of contributions without any real change in the size of the total contributions. The whole operation affected percentages but not real flows of money. Thus the new system is based on the same contribution inflow as the previous system.
Final remarks
Providing people with social security – including financing consumption of the retired generation out of the product of the working generation - is very high on the list of social priorities in most countries. It is especially important in European societies. However, the inefficiency of traditional pension systems put achieving this goal at risk. Social and populist rhetoric suggests to the public that changes within the pension system are dangerous for social goals. In reality, for most countries in the world, it is just the opposite. The longer the traditional pension systems are held up, the more socially damaging effects will be created. Poland belongs to a non-numerous group of countries that are prepared for one of the most difficult challenges of our time, namely the ageing of the population. The new pension system will not only stop the increase of costs of the pension system but will also
allow for their reduction. This will leave more resources available for development, which, in turn, will contribute to stronger growth and the increase of living standards of both the working and the retired generation. The example of the new Polish pension system, as well as the Swedish one, is interesting for yet another reason. This type of system contributes to labour mobility, which is particularly needed in Europe. Free movement of labour cannot be achieved if moving from one country to another affects expected retirement income. As such, aiming at pension system neutrality will be more and more important for European integration.
译文:
重新引入代际均衡:波兰养老保险制度
摘要
波兰于1999年通过了新的养老金制度。这种新的养老保险制度允许波兰,以减少退休金支出(占GDP 的百分比),而不是增加它 -正如预计的经合组织其他大多数国家。本文介绍了概念背景的新系统的设计。新系统的长期目的是确保人口代际平衡,不论情况。这需要稳定的国内生产总值的份额分配给整个退休一代。传统的养老金制度的目的,相反,在稳定的份额人均国内生产总值退休人员。在人口结构的变化观察到,在过去的一夫妻几十年,这历史性的尝试,以稳定为首占GDP 的比重为退休人员严重的财政问题和经济增长负外部性,如观察许多国家。许多国家曾试图改革其养老金制度不同的方法来尝试解决这些不断增加的费用问题。虽然波兰改革采用了其他地方应用技术,它的设计不同于典型的做法和教训,结果是有希望的所有经合组织国家。本文介绍了这一理论和实际应用另一种方法,因此,新的波兰养老保险制度主要特点设计。
导言
人口结构的转型与政策过于短视一起造成了严重的问题在全世界许多国家地区的养老金。传统的要素养老金制度的设计包括对捐款的薄弱环节和利益缺乏超过该系统的成本控制。这些因素列入养老保险制度导致爆炸的设计成本,造成了负增长的外部因素和导致失业率持续高企。因此,养老金改革的追求现已在世界各地,特别是在欧洲的政策议程的顶部。然而,很少有国家能够在引进根本性的改革面积到了这个时候养老金。在这种情况下,改革的定义是至关重要的。对于本文的目的,“改革”是指改变系统,以消除而不是仅仅在边缘玩的贡献率 - 结构性效率低下和退休年龄调整为短期财政和系统的参数政治传统的养老金制
度已被证明是低效率的提供与社会保障。在同一时间试图治愈这些系统阻碍了缺乏共识什么可以取代传统的制度。讨论这问题涉及混乱的思想背景下产生的讨论 参与者,以及从这些概念作为过度使用“支付即用即付”与“资金”,即“公”与“私”,而在同一时间,忽略了数重要的经济问题。
经济学家们忽略传统的养老金。设计和运行养老金制度是留给非经济 此外,
学家,谁没有广泛关注与如何资助长期或如何弥补这些养老金养老金系统的负外部性。波兰新养老保险制度属于非常小的成功的尝试次数适用于现代思想的地区。这并不意味着如某些人承担放弃社会安全目标。相反,关键想法是放弃提供社会保障的低效率的方法,以挽救其目标和原则。
第一个重点是一般性问题的讨论需要解决的养老保险制 本文由两部分组成。
度设计时。这些问题是提交方式,超出了传统思维方式对养老金去。在这方面的论文的第二部分,重要的是要指出,最在目前的欧盟成员国和候选国的国家养老金系统,基本上是在政策层面基本相同。因此,解决方案在一个会员国或候选国可以预期是相同的。比如,在法国,德国,意大利,捷克共和国,匈牙利的欧洲国家和其他欧洲国家,波兰和瑞典在过去的几十年,直到晚1990年的开发效率低下,成本高昂的养老金制度。因此,在部分二论文中,我们会研究如何波兰现在已经成功实施的办法列于论文的第一部分,并建立了一个强大的和中立的根本养老保险制度。
选择一般问题
养老保险制度的设计已经考虑到了一些问题。它们的充分介绍和讨论超出了这个范围,本文提出仅列出审议的问题和最重要的意见。养老保险制度:外部性与中立养老保险制度的一个描述很大程度上取决于双方的汇总和个人观点。从聚合的角度,养老金制度是当前的划分方式国内生产总值之间的部分工作所保存的一代和部分分配对退休一代。从个人的角度,养老金制度是收入分配方式对一个人的生命周期。不论持有上述方法应用的技术或思想观点。养老保险制度,上述定义的,并不一定是随收随付即付或资助。这些功能源于同时在技术内容上的应用退休金制度,而不是从系统本身。如果养老保险制度设计匿名参与和承担的再分配规模相当庞大,然后我们通常称此系统随收随付友去。如果养老保险制度