习近平模式与中国经济改革

十八届三中全会结束已经一年多，中国的经济改革已经进入实施阶段。在此背景下，3月11日，CIDEG邀请加州大学圣地亚哥分校国际关系与太平洋研究学院教授、CIDEG学术委员BarryNaughton举办题为“中国经济改革是否存在‘习大大模式’？”的专题讲座。同时，邀请清华大学公共管理学院崔之元教授担任评论嘉宾，清华大学公共管理学院副教授、CIDEG副主任陈玲担任讲座主持。清华CIDEG理事会理事德地立人先生列席了讲座。

“习式”经济改革成为习近平政策议程中的一个重要部分。他不仅设立了深改组监管改革进程，也在改革模式的选择上始终保持自上而下的谨慎态度。这种自上而下的改革模式完全不同于20世纪80年代那种自下而上的改革模式，也与90年代的制度改革大相径庭。BarryNaughton教授谈到从整个2014年来看，经济改革是否以较大的力度推行尚不明晰，但是从2014年9月以后，至少在地方财政体系改革、农村土地制度改革以及加速中国经济全球化的进程三个方面有了显而易见的变化，这些改革都是真正以市场为导向的经济改革。同时，BarryNaughton教授总结了“习式”经济改革所具有的六个方面特点，他表示目前对于“习式”经济改革下结论为时尚早，很多人对于“威权式改革”存有疑虑。但毋庸置疑的是，“习式”改革的风格已经充分展现，它的具体特征和未来发展趋势还有待观察。

崔之元教授在随后的点评中谈到论及“习式”的改革，我们值得注意的是近期他本人对于改革理念的陈述，即“四个全面”。他同意BarryNaughton教授所说的习近平与他的前任领导人不同，更加具备“克里斯玛式”的个人权威，但他认为这是因为其支持者的要求。他说习近平“克里斯玛式”权威存在与否、好坏与否、可持续与否需要进一步探讨，但可以肯定的是我们正在走向一个未来并不是非常明晰的时期。

讲座最后，现场的同学们就所关心的问题与BarryNaughton教授和崔之元教授进行了充分的讨论，两位教授精彩的回答令讲座现场气氛达到高潮。

讲座内容实录如下：

一、习近平是否真刀真枪地推行经济改革？

十一届三中全会之后，中国列出了很长的经济改革清单，然而外界对于这些改革的进展持有不同的态度，。美国乔治•华盛顿大学教授DavidShambaugh3月6日在《华尔街日报》发表文章称，习近平改革的宏伟目标尚未真正进入落实阶段，由于触及到利益集团的利益，改革的阻力十分巨大。但也有然而中国的一位独立

经济学家认为改革已经开始实施，到2020年将会看到三中全会的改革措施全面开展实现。

从整个2014年来看，经济改革是否以较大的力度推行尚不太明晰，但是从2014年9月以后，至少在三个方面的改革是显而易见并且至关重要的：

一是地方财政体系改革。从2014年8月开始，债台高筑的地方政府债务平台从地方财政体系中分离出来。从2009年金融危机之后地方政府通过举债一定程度上保证了经济的稳定，然而从长期来看，政府肆意举债势必会对中国的经济和金融稳定产生危害。有数据表明，2013年地方政府的债务总额占全国GDP的比重达到35%。因此，解决地方政府债务问题十分重要，为此中国政府先后出台了一些系列政策试图加以解决。例如，2014年8月修改《中华人民共和国预算法》、2014年国务院出台《关于加强地方政府性债务管理的意见》等。尽管这一改革是一项激进的、雄心勃勃的改革，但却也是一项悄然进行的改革，未见媒体大幅渲染。

二是农村土地制度改革。在2014年9月29日召开的中央全面深化改革领导小组第五次会议上，习近平表态要在坚持农村土地集体所有前提下实行三权分置，即耕地所有权、承包权和经营权的分离。改革开放至今，除了所有权以外，农村土地承包权和经营权大部分时间是合二为一的，统称“土地承包经营权”。这一改革提供了一个清晰的农村土地制度，保障了农民的土地的转让经营权力，获得租金，同时又不用担忧失去对土地的承包权关系。

三是进一步加速中国经济全球化的进程。APEC峰会以后，中国与其他国家签订了一系列的双边贸易协定，例如中韩自由贸易协定、中澳自由贸易协定等，中美双边投资协定也正在洽谈之中。同时APEC会议以后，国内也辅以一些列改革措施，例如建立证券交易“沪港通”机制、推动上海、广东、天津、福建四地的自贸试验区建设等。

上述三项改革之所以重要是因为它们都是真正以市场为导向的经济改革。这些改革让市场准入限制放宽，促进了市场的公平竞争，降低了行政干预的范围。其次，每项改革都试图从经济体制的根本方面对问题加以解决。同时，每项改革措施都也都面对反对者的声音，这意味着高层政治领导需要利用政治资源去说服反对者或者与其达成政治交易以获取他们的支持。

有趣的是，这些改革既没有被媒体大幅度宣传，也没有在国内外社会公众之间广为讨论流传。，此外，也没有迹象表明这三项改革是十八届三中全会《决定》决定中三百多项改革措施里的首要的改革任务，甚至这些改革也没有顶层设计。二、经济改革中的“习近平模式”经济改革的主要特点

Daughton教授对“习近平模式”经济改革的特点进行了归纳，尽管相应的特点随着改革的进行和深入可能会不断发生变化，但我初步认为，“习近平模式”的经济改革拥有以下六方面特点：

1.“习式”改革是自上而下，的威权式的改革。改革是自上而下的，并且裁量权保留在最高层。经济改革仅仅是习近平众多改革中的一小部分，“习模式”的经济改革融合了广泛、宏大和渐进主义的特点。改革并没有全景式的蓝图，却不难看出是按照一系列中央设计的制度和程序进行的。习近平迅速地巩固了权力，树立了其个人权威，在其前任胡锦涛“学院派开明专制”基础上融入了更多个人魅力和威权式元素。这种特征让中国的体制更具活力和动力，但潜在地也更加难以预测，甚至暗藏危机。

2.改革发展与制度过程相协调。尽管改革没有顶层设计，但习近平却十分重视制度过程。中央全面深化改革领导小组下设6个专项小组，分别为：经济体制和生态文明体制改革、民主法制领域改革、文化体制改革、社会体制改革、党的建设制度改革、纪律检查体制改革专项小组。这些小组的设置增强了习近平个人的权威，让中国共产党可以对改革进行全面的掌控。领导小组的工作机制将改革任务分解传递至对应各个小组，并且向领导小组汇报工作。“改革领导小组”工作机制在地方政府和各部委之间进行了复制，地方政府长官既是改革的领导者，也是受改革的影响者，因此处于一种不确定性较高的微妙境地。

3.改革的政治学动力发生了变化。早期的中国经济改革依赖于自下而上的激励作为驱动力。例如上世纪80年代的改革，具有企业家精神的地方政府是改革的驱动者，许成钢教授认为“分权式权威威权主义”是这种改革的主要特征。又如90年代的改革，地方政府放弃了部分财政权力权利但获取了更大程度的地方经济自治权。然而现今的改革动力却恰恰相反，中国是否应该摒弃企业家式的地方政府是一个值得探讨的问题。

4.改革能否被巩固尚存不确定性。启动改革与巩固改革之间存在很大的差异，启动一项改革需要的是一个团结的改革者团队和强大的政治权威来克服官僚政治的阻力；然而巩固改革的成果却截然不同，需要建立稳定的机制，形成全新的改革受益者和支持者联盟。从这一点来说，习式改革的成果能否被巩固还有待于进一步观察。

5.改革具有不均衡性、突然性、仓促性和不可预测性。自上而下的改革方式过于依赖顶层决策者的注意力。面对大量的问题，决策者通常难以事无巨细地做出完全准确、理性的决策。此外，习近平的改革日程中包括反腐败、强化党的领导、坚定的国家主义、意识形态控制和经济改革，这些要素之间某种意义上存在

一定内在矛盾，让改革的未来更加难以预知。

6.改革在某些方面可能超出预期。由于改革的措施涉及到经济领域的多个方面，这些改革之间彼此相互补充或相互强化，“习式”经济改革的最终影响或许比各个分领域改革的加总和来得更大。改革的进程至少在某些方面是极其深入和全面的。

三、关于“习近平模式”经济改革的结论

Naughton教授认为目前对于“习式”经济改革下结论为时尚早，很多人对于“威权式改革”存有疑虑。因为在他们看来，毕竟没有自由的信息、自由的言论和市场，中国成功转型为一个创新型社会是相当困难的。但毋庸置疑的是，“习式”改革的风格已经充分展现，它的具体特征和未来发展趋势还有待观察。

四、崔之元教授点评

Naughton教授对于中国各个领域的政策制定都有细致入微的观察和深刻的理论洞察力。我注意到Naughton教授讲“习式”经济改革归纳为自上而下的改革，但同时也强调这种自上而下的模式却没有顶层设计。尽管这并不一定是矛盾的，但至少提醒我们某种张力的存在。

论及“习近平式”的改革，我们值得注意的是近期他本人对于改革理念的陈述，即“四个全面”。分别是“全面建成小康社会”、“全面深化改革”、“全面依法治国”、“全面从严治党”，我认为“全面建成小康社会”是改革的总体目标，后三个“全面”是实现总目标的具体措施和路径。习近平在2012年底时曾经强调过改革的顶层设计，但在2014年12月举行的第七次深改小组会议中强调改革要推动顶层设计与基层探索互动。在这次会议上，习近平对农村土地改革进行了深入的阐述，并选择了9个县进行农村集体建设用地直接入市的试验。在过去农村集体建设用地不能够直接入市，但在去年进行了试验性治理。因此从这一点上来说，我认为“习式”经济改革仍然是连续的。

此外，我同意Naughton教授所说的习近平与他的前任领导人不同，更加具备“克里斯玛式”的个人权威，但我更加认为这是因为其支持者的要求，例如很多人对于落马的官员非常不满，厌恶腐败的发生，但他们同时也认为是因为习近平的前任领导人们权威较弱才纵容了这些腐败官员的存在。习近平“克里斯玛式”权威存在与否、好坏与否、可持续与否需要进一步探讨，但可以肯定的是我们已经进入了一个新的时期，正如习近平去年5月在河南考察时所说“中国发展需要适应新常态”。在西方经济学语境下，“新常态”是一个略带贬义的词汇，然而在中国社会却并非如此，我们正在走向一个未来并不非常明晰的时期。

五、问答环节

Q1：关于您提到的习近平的三项经济改革，似乎都是微观层面的经济改革，然而从宏观层面来看，中国的经济改革应当是从出口导向型向扩大内需转变，您是否觉得在这方面的改革力度太小？

Prof.Naughton：我认为这个问题事实上是关于中国经济“新常态”的问题，中国高层领导人克服了很大的困难进行改革，适应经济条件的根本变化，尤其在劳动力供给不足等外部条件的制约下。从历史来看，从高速增长向中等速度增长的转型过程是相当艰难的，例如日本、韩国都在这一过程中遭遇了很严重的经济危机，我认为改革通常都是微观的，总的来说中国的宏观经济表现不错，正在稳步向前迈进。

Q2：关于农村土地制度改革，2008年10月中国政府等出台改革文件促进农村土地流转，当时尤其在西方媒体出现了大量的宣传，因而为什么您认为土地制度改革是习近平模式独有的经济改革？

Prof.Naughton：我们必须看到现在的政策正是式对于2008年政策失败的回应，2008年的政策承认了中国的农民应该拥有承包土地的转让经营权，但这还远远不够，而目前的改革的实实在在的，赋予了农民实实在在的土地产权权利。在未来五年可能在全国范围内完成这项改革，所以我认为这项改革创造了全新的格局。

Q3：既然目前还无法对改革下任何定论，那您认为我们应当如何去看待改革是否是在向前行，研究时应当关注那些指标和信息来源，如何建议未来的改革政策走向？

Prof.Naughton：首先我认为应当多去跟人们交流，例如人们从一年前就开始议论财政改革，但截止到去年底都没有看到任何真正的改革措施，这是令人沮丧的事实，但是在北京开始流传出一些谣传，尽管作为一个学者这样说略显尴尬，但是我认为有时尝试去聆听一些谣传也是有道理的，因为人们对于亟待改革的问题广泛讨论，最终通过一些渠道进入媒体的视野。除此之外，还需要加入你自身的判断，哪些是重要的，哪些无关紧要，广泛全面的进行思考。

崔之元教授：对于我来说，这个问题比较难回答。我之所以进行试验性治理研究恰恰是为了能够让我们能够更加解放思想，准确的把握什么是改革所需要的目标和方式。我们不应该理所当然的认为改革的目标是什么，因为改革的目标也应该因地制宜，根据实际情况进行调整。举一个简单的例子：有人评论中国资本市场的改革成效如何，通过给中国资本市场自由化改革简单的设定一个时间表来衡量改革的进展与成效，然而甚至IMF在内的机构在金融危机之后都未曾将资

五、问答环节

Q1：关于您提到的习近平的三项经济改革，似乎都是微观层面的经济改革，然而从宏观层面来看，中国的经济改革应当是从出口导向型向扩大内需转变，您是否觉得在这方面的改革力度太小？

Prof.Naughton：我认为这个问题事实上是关于中国经济“新常态”的问题，中国高层领导人克服了很大的困难进行改革，适应经济条件的根本变化，尤其在劳动力供给不足等外部条件的制约下。从历史来看，从高速增长向中等速度增长的转型过程是相当艰难的，例如日本、韩国都在这一过程中遭遇了很严重的经济危机，我认为改革通常都是微观的，总的来说中国的宏观经济表现不错，正在稳步向前迈进。

Q2：关于农村土地制度改革，2008年10月中国政府等出台改革文件促进农村土地流转，当时尤其在西方媒体出现了大量的宣传，因而为什么您认为土地制度改革是习近平模式独有的经济改革？

Prof.Naughton：我们必须看到现在的政策正是式对于2008年政策失败的回应，2008年的政策承认了中国的农民应该拥有承包土地的转让经营权，但这还远远不够，而目前的改革的实实在在的，赋予了农民实实在在的土地产权权利。在未来五年可能在全国范围内完成这项改革，所以我认为这项改革创造了全新的格局。

Q3：既然目前还无法对改革下任何定论，那您认为我们应当如何去看待改革是否是在向前行，研究时应当关注那些指标和信息来源，如何建议未来的改革政策走向？

Prof.Naughton：首先我认为应当多去跟人们交流，例如人们从一年前就开始议论财政改革，但截止到去年底都没有看到任何真正的改革措施，这是令人沮丧的事实，但是在北京开始流传出一些谣传，尽管作为一个学者这样说略显尴尬，但是我认为有时尝试去聆听一些谣传也是有道理的，因为人们对于亟待改革的问题广泛讨论，最终通过一些渠道进入媒体的视野。除此之外，还需要加入你自身的判断，哪些是重要的，哪些无关紧要，广泛全面的进行思考。

崔之元教授：对于我来说，这个问题比较难回答。我之所以进行试验性治理研究恰恰是为了能够让我们能够更加解放思想，准确的把握什么是改革所需要的目标和方式。我们不应该理所当然的认为改革的目标是什么，因为改革的目标也应该因地制宜，根据实际情况进行调整。举一个简单的例子：有人评论中国资本市场的改革成效如何，通过给中国资本市场自由化改革简单的设定一个时间表来衡量改革的进展与成效，然而甚至IMF在内的机构在金融危机之后都未曾将资

本市场自由化作为改革是否有效的标准。

在此我想再提一下Barry刚刚所说的为什么现在的农村土地制度改革是对2008年的回应，去年12月份的中央农村工作会议上，习近平首次提出了“三权分置”的概念，过去只有“所有权”和“承包经营权”两个权利的概念，现在将承包经营权分离为“承包权”与“经营权”，尽管在实践中这两种权利已经出现了分离，但这是第一次在概念上对这两种权利概念进行了区分，这个例子是对改革目标的重新思考。这一系列“权利束”如何划分也许没有一个永恒的静态最优解，而是不断变化的。

Q4：请问意识形态控制与未来进一步改革之间是否存在某种关系？

Prof.Naughton：我个人认为意识形态控制与改革之间是相互矛盾的，从道义上来说是错误的，对于改革是会有阻碍作用的，因而我认为两者之间没有必然联系。

崔之元教授：我承认很多观点认为加强意识形态控制对于改革与发展来说是不利的，甚至是错误的。但从另外一个角度来说，我认为改革过程中会遇到很多新的事物和理念，对于最高领导人来讲也需要一个学习与适应的过程。

Q5：两位认为五年之后的中国经济将会是怎样？

Prof.Naughton：这个问题很难回答，我个人觉得中国经济的未来是一个五五分的可能性，目前正面临关键的转型期，在将来很可能市场化水平会更高，经济结构与现在也会大不相同。如果未来遇到了严重的经济震荡或者改革在某些方面出现了倒退，那结果将和今天的现状没有太多不同。

崔之元：在2008年国际金融危机之后，有很多关于中国经济再平衡的讨论，是否应该减少靠对外出口拉动GDP的依赖程度。事实上中国已经做出了一定程度的调整，尽管还远远不够。楼继伟在前不久的新闻发布会上提到工业生产者出厂价格连续30个月下降，还有很多指标显示中国经济目前不太理想，人们开始担心中国会出现通货紧缩，甚至昨天还出现了关于中国货币量化宽松的谣传。从上个月中国的贸易数据来看，中国的外贸表现不错，但这是一把双刃剑，因为很可能会促使一部分人退回到旧有的发展模式中去。明年中国将举办2016年G20峰会，希望届时中国能够和世界各主要国家一道为世界经济共同发展努力。

Q6：您认为地方政府党委书记作为改革者，主要的改革目标是什么？

Prof.Naughton：《财经》杂志近期有一篇文章说中国有99名干部自杀，地方政府官员承受巨大的压力，有些甚至感觉到麻木，失去了勇气。因为在中国，地方党委书记同时也是当地的全面深化改革领导小组委员会的长官，他们对于改革

的目标也并不是非常明确。所以这个问题最好直接由地方的党委书记直接回答（笑）。

崔之元教授：我非常同意Barry的观点，但我同时也认为地方领导还有很多可以进行改革试验的空间。地方的官员不能像前重庆市委书记薄熙来那么直言不讳为所欲为，甚至去挑战中央的权威，但是习近平也强调地方官员不能消极怠工，要敢于担当。所以地方官员是有很多进行政策创新试验的空间。

Prof.Naughton：能够举一个政策创新试验的例子？

崔之元：我想举一个上海自贸区的例子。首先上海获得了中央进行自贸区试验的支持，但是具体的政策实践是有很大的自主创新空间的，这样的自主创新是有一定风险的，例如自贸区的企业可以更加容易的从海外借贷。如果我们回顾一下美国和欧洲的金融危机，主要的原因是影子银行，中国的“影子银行”主要以理财产品的形式存在，而自贸区的企业从海外借贷是会承担很大的风险的。因为这部分借款是不会记录在资产负债表之内的。

Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform?

Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014

Barry Naughton

China’s economic reform took major steps forward beginning in the fourth quarter of 2014. Major policy initiatives were launched on consolidation

of local government finances and debt, agricultural land property rights,

and preparations for commitment to more rigorous free-trade agreements. The period of slow reform progress after the Third Plenum has now ended. We can now start to see the outlines of a distinctive “Xi Model” of

economic reforms.

Xi Jinping’s policy agenda continues to be marked by abundant contradictory components. Ideological repression, great power aspirations, and great leader propaganda coexist with an ongoing campaign against corruption and significant

measures of economic reform. Some pundits argue that these contradictory elements can be explained by one or another simple formula: Xi is “really” a reformer, or really a leftist, or really just a dictator. These overly simple approaches should be ignored. Those who advance them are merely inventing plausible stories to reconcile apparent contradictions. Although all these simple characterizations of Xi Jinping may contain elements of truth, no simple formula comes anywhere close to explaining the disparate, shifting, and sometimes massively contradictory elements of Xi’s agenda. It is enough right now if we can clearly describe the elements of the Xi agenda, and perhaps assess the relative weight and possible trajectory of some of these elements.

In fact, within the jumble of disparate policy elements in the Xi agenda, in the latter part of 2014 there was a substantial shift in relative importance. The importance of economic reforms increased palpably as, for the first time, Xi began to put considerable political muscle behind specific strands of the economic reform agenda. The economic reform program has now moved out of the earlier stages of preparation and the creation of specialized institutions to manage the reform process (as described in earlier CLMs). Earlier assessments, even when positive, have inevitably been cautious, because implementation has been slow, relative to the bold and broad declarations of the November 2013 Third Plenum.1 Today, however, we can start to see important areas where economic reforms have moved beyond rhetoric into important efforts of practical implementation. This does not necessarily mean that Xi has found an effective or reasonable “model” of reform, but it certainly changes the terms of the conversation we should be having about economic policy. Xi’s economic reforms are now serious and real, and deserve serious and careful attention.2 Oddly, so far the important measures discussed here have been presented in a somewhat understated way in the Chinese press, and have received very little press attention outside China. This shortcoming should be rectified as soon as possible.

Naughton, China Leadership Monitor, no. 46

In the following, I survey three key elements of economic reform that moved into serious implementation in the October–November 2014 time frame. Each of these three is

complex, and a full analysis, or even a complete description, cannot really be achieved in this short format. The first section lists all three policy areas. Sections two through four describe the policy content for each of the measures. In Section five, I present an

extremely preliminary set of observations about the nature of the emerging “Xi model” of economic reform.

Three Policy Measures

In the space of a few months, and with little fanfare, Beijing policy-makers introduced the following three economic reform policy packages:

a) A program was adopted to divorce local government finances from the corporate “local government funding vehicles” that have been piling up debt since the global financial crisis. This policy includes capping local debt and reclassifying and

restructuring debt into public debt (essentially “municipal bonds”) and corporate debt (including for companies that produce public services). This is a bold and aggressive program that seeks to fundamentally shift the relationship between local governments and debt markets. At the same time, it will lead to a major short-term reduction in local government financial resources.

b) A new system of property rights was introduced for agricultural land that provides

protection to farmers and a clear system to support renting, leasing, and mortgaging land.

c) At the APEC Leaders’ Summit in Beijing (November 9–12, 2014), China undertook new commitments in a range of international negotiations, substantively completing free-trade agreements with Korea and Australia, and moved forward in agreements with the United States. While no individual step was a game-changer, cumulatively these moves amounted to an important shift toward a more open economic regime, particularly since complementary domestic policy steps were also taken.

Each of these policy initiatives addresses fundamental aspects of the economic system. In some cases—such as land rights—the new measures address contentious political or theoretical issues that have defeated efforts at resolution for a decade or more. Each of the policy initiatives has opposition, so the top political leadership must have expended political capital, either in overwhelming the opponents, or in working out political deals that would bring them on board. Let us consider each of these initiatives in turn.

Fiscal Reforms: Tackling Local Government Finance and Debt

On October 2, the State Council published an important document, Number 43 of 2014, entitled “Opinions on Strengthening Management of Local Government Debt.”3 Couched in general terms, the document nonetheless marked a dramatic turning point toward a much more rigorous and fundamental effort to tackle local government debt. Readers of the last issue of the Monitor will recall that fiscal reforms had already been heating up. The Comprehensively Deepen Reform Leadership Small Group, chaired by 2

Xi Jinping, at its third meeting on June 6, 2014, approved a fiscal reform program (which was not released). Minister of Finance Lou Jiwei had then outlined an ambitious three-stage reform program in a July 2014 interview,4 and at the end of August, the National Budget Law was revised in several important respects, most obviously in that it gave local governments the right to issue government bonds.5 Minister Lou’s first stage of reform, beginning immediately, had targeted the “budgetary management system,” including procedures for budget transparency, better legal foundation and oversight by the National People’s Congress, and systems for managing local government debt. What had not been clear at that time, but quickly became clear after the promulgation of State Council Document No. 43, was that the improved management system for local

government debt would be accompanied by an immediate ambitious effort to tackle the local government debt problem directly, and attempt to control it once and for all.

State Council Document No. 43, only four pages long, addressed all the main issues

head-on, but in a rather general fashion. The document announced a “no bailout policy,” as far as the central government was concerned.6 This immediately caused uncertainty in the bond market, since investors are unsurprisingly concerned about the value of their investments.7 While important, the uncertainty about bond values may have distracted attention from other aspects of this important policy shift. The State Council also

announced that local government funding vehicles (the investment corporations set up by governments to carry out their investment projects) should be made into corporations unambiguously separated from local governments, or else liquidated. The document called upon local governments to concentrate responsibility for local debt at the

provincial level, to inventory total local debt, and to screen and classify debts according to repayment capacity of the assets created. This clearly marked the beginning of a major new initiative to cap and control the local debt problem.

Dramatic as the contents of Document No. 43 were, most of the measures were also echoes of policies that had been attempted over the last few years, without substantial effect. However, as the Ministry of Finance’s program to implement Document No. 43 progressed, it gradually become clear that this was a far more ambitious effort than anything that has been attempted since the global financial crisis. The Ministry of Finance asked local governments to do the following:

1. Each province must inventory all local government debt, particularly bank debt, as of December 2014, and report it to the Ministry by January 5, 2015.8 The State Audit Bureau had carried out a comprehensive audit of local debt through June 30, 2013, and fiscal records were to be used to update these records through the end of 2014. That earlier audit had covered 7,170 local government funding vehicles, and a total debt plus contingent liabilities of 30 trillion yuan.

2. Once the provincial figure was reported to the Ministry and approved by the State Council, it was to be permanently capped. That is, the provincial total debt cannot increase, although the province still will have some leeway to shift its total debt quota among sub-provincial governments (as some local governments pay off their debt).

3. All completed projects financed with debt are to be divided into three categories. (a) Projects with no revenues should be acknowledged as the responsibility of local

government and absorbed onto the local government balance sheet. The debts incurred in the construction of these projects therefore should become direct government liabilities. Local governments may not fund these projects through bank loans, and must issue government bonds to pay off the outstanding bank debt. (b) Projects with sufficient

revenues to service debt should be spun off into enterprise. The specific debts associated with the construction of a given project should be clearly demarcated, and the revenues from the (new) enterprise should be dedicated to servicing that debt. (c) Projects in an intermediate category—with significant positive revenues but not enough to service and repay the associated debt—should be restructured into new enterprises which the local government provides with an annual subsidy or other fixed contractual support. Preferably this new firm would be a public-private partnership (PPP), the currently fashionable approach to public service enterprises that aligns with the push toward “mixed ownership” for state-owned firms.. Once this classification is completed, local governments will be completely prohibited from borrowing from banks. All government debt must be structured as municipal bonds, and declared in the local government capital budget which is to be drawn up and published alongside the regular current revenue and expenditure budget.

4. Existing loan contracts for projects under construction will continue to be honored, provided they were fully approved by September 30, 2014. Loan contracts will not be renewed at completion, and by the end of 2015, all public projects should be funded by local government municipal bonds. After the end of 2015, local government funding vehicles will no longer borrow from banks.

5. The price of enterprise and municipal debt should be market-determined. Local

governments should not guarantee the debt of subordinate governments. New systems of accountability and performance evaluation will be introduced for government officials, especially at the provincial level.

This is a remarkably bold and thorough proposal. Indeed, there are substantial implementation risks because the proposal may be too demanding in terms of

compliance, and somewhat disruptive in its economic impact. Local governments were told in October to inventory their debts as of year-end and report them by January 5. Compliance with this schedule is not really realistic, and only one province, Hainan, was approved to announce it debt figures by the end of February. In the event, commentators suggested that the Hainan numbers were approved for disclosure not because they were accurate, but because they didn’t display any big shortcomings: total debt was not large relative to provincial GDP, and the growth rate of debt was acceptable.9 Hainan reported that its local debt grew 22 percent between mid-2013 and end-2014, and that 84 percent of the debt was local government responsibility, with government possessing various degrees of contingent liability for the other 16 percent. None of this debt could be

converted into enterprise debt in the short term. The release of this one province’s debt figures is thus quite revealing. The delays show that local governments are under great time pressure, and indeed may be intentionally dragging their feet on a measure that

certainly does not work in their interests. Moreover, the fact that the rapid 22 percent growth of Hainan’s government debt was considered acceptably moderate shows that local governments have incentives to come up with as large a number as possible for the debt they acknowledge. If they have to accept a new debt ceiling, it should be as large as possible, and local governments can probably assume that the central Ministry will be cooperative in helping them to get this debt restructured and listed on the local

government capital budget.10 The Ministry of Finance is thus struggling to impose limits on new local government debt without acknowledging—and de facto accepting—excessively high levels of existing debt.

Agricultural Land Rights

Property rights in land are complicated in China, not least because property rights are divided into two completely different regimes in rural and urban areas. There are many respects in which change in the land system has been slower than expected since the Third Plenum, particularly in the procedures for converting rural land into land with urban development rights.11 However, in one respect there has been a major

breakthrough. On November 20, 2014, the CCP and State Council jointly issued a document on rural land policy.12 The essence of the policy was to specify that

agricultural land has three levels of ownership: the underlying collective ownership, which never changes; the land contract rights, which date back to the distribution of land to households in the early 1980s; and land management rights. Land contract rights belong to the individual household and are stable and long-term (meaning that villages should not redistribute contract rights or take them away from out-migrants). Land management rights, by contrast, are transferable. They can and should be rented or leased, without detriment to the farmer’s underlying contract rights. Moreover, the land use rights can be contributed as an equity stake to an agricultural corporation. This new specification of contract and use rights should be understood in conjunction with the work of surveying and titling all land—already well under way in many regions—which is to be completed nationwide within five years.

The fundamental impact of this policy is to create a nationwide system of secure and transferable property rights in agricultural land. As Zheng Fengtian 郑风田 of People’s University explains, “Ever since the beginning of reform, aside from the [fundamental collective] ownership of rural land, land contract rights and land use rights have generally been bundled together into a single thing, that is ‘land contract and use rights.’ But with the establishment of three [levels of property] rights, farmers can relax and transfer their land use rights, receive rent, and not worry about losing their contractual rights to the land.”13 This important change shows up in the 2015 No. 1 Party Document, which,

following tradition, is devoted to rural policy.14 The wordy document covers many topics of interest, and refers to the new property rights policy obliquely but unmistakably. Section 22, titled “reform of the property rights system in rural collectives,” states that the focus should be on “resolutely and realistically doing the work of determining rights, registering, and issuing certification [i.e., titling] for contracting and management rights” for land and other types of natural resource capital. This should be read in tandem with Section 28 on the rule of law, which says “revise the laws on rural land contracting in order to concretely specify that current land contracting relations are stable, long-lasting

and unchanging; to clearly demarcate the [three-way] relationship between collective ownership, rural household contract rights, and land management rights; and to guarantee and protect the rights of rural women to the benefits from land contracting.”15

Given that this is such an important policy change, its presence in the No. 1 document, and in Chinese government propaganda overall, is remarkably muted. The evidence is clearly there, but the casual reader will not have noticed the change. There doesn’t appear to have been any commentary in the English-language press at all.16 Why is this policy shift so understated? The answer may lie in the fact that improving rural land property rights has long been a highly contentious issue in China, and reformers may prefer to duck the debate. Most market-oriented economists strongly support

strengthening land rights, because this will give farmers the ability to use their land rights in diverse ways (including renting, mortgaging, and using as collateral) and will provide the proper incentives to restructure agriculture in more efficient ways. “Leftists” strongly oppose private land ownership, arguing that it violates one of the central covenants of socialism. More importantly, privatization of land rights has long been opposed by Chen Xiwen, the most influential rural policy economist. Chen has high personal credibility as someone who understands the rural economy and has dedicated his life to addressing rural policy issues. Moreover, he occupies the key staff/advisory position as head of the office of the Party Rural Work Leadership Small Group (and is concurrently vice-head of the office of the Finance and Economics Leadership Small Group). Chen Xiwen has long worried that with land privatization, commercial capital would buy up land and many poor farmers would lose the protection of land ownership, which represents their ultimate “social security.”

The current policy is obviously a compromise, but one that has successfully brought Chen Xiwen into the pro-market camp, enabling him to support a policy that effectively allows for transferable land-use rights. The unmistakable sign of the policy compromise is the commitment to a stratum of basically unchangeable “contract rights,” which will become a kind of sub-surface ownership difficult for farmers to alienate. Over the long term, this could be a rather awkward provision: will there be a permanent class of former farmers who clip coupons, harvesting rent from farms they gave up generations ago? In any case, conditions in China’s rural areas are changing rapidly and new policies could scarcely be put off much longer. Most young farmers have already left the land, and most rural income is no longer derived from farming. Institutions must catch up with the changed rural reality, and this new policy created a space for compromise that allowed consensus among policy elites. Leftist opponents of market-oriented reform will, of course, continue to oppose such measures.

The Beijing APEC Meeting: Launchpad for a Cluster of Trade Reform Measures

China hosted the APEC Leaders’ Summit November 9–12, 2014. This highly orchestrated event produced many newsworthy outcomes, including “APEC Blue” artificially fair skies, a handshake between Xi Jinping and Abe Shinzo, and agreement between China and the United States to jointly tackle climate change. In his opening remarks, Xi made a ringing statement that “openness brings progress, closure leads to

stagnation.”17 Clearly in such a highly scripted environment, we should be cautious in interpreting the various economic agreements and policy demarches that are timed to produce positive news when world attention is focused on China and on Xi Jinping in particular. Even so, the externally oriented initiatives announced at the time of the APEC summit were cumulatively important and add up to a substantial reform package.

Pride of place should go to the two free-trade agreements (FTAs) that received the final impetus toward completion around the time of the summit (and which have since been initialed and await ratification). The Korea-China FTA is admittedly a relatively “low-level” FTA, meaning that many products are excluded and phase-in times are relatively long (20 years in some cases). Nevertheless, given the close interactions between the two economies, it will still have substantial impact.18 The Australia-China FTA is arguably of even greater long-term significance. It is a “higher-level” FTA, meaning that it extends to more service sectors, and includes significant provisions for regulatory

harmonization and dispute settlement. Moreover, China granted Australia “most favored nation” status in the agreement, meaning that any further concessions made in other trade pacts will be automatically extended to Australian firms.19 Indeed, the very fact that the two FTAs are so different means that they (along with agreements with Hong Kong and Taiwan) will push China towards greater openness. Sensitive Chinese sectors such as finance and agriculture will face increased competition. The significance of these

agreements was underlined when the commerce minister announced at his March 7 press conference at the National People’s Congress that the top priority for 2015 would be upgrading the existing China-APEC FTA and then on pursuing the China-Korea-Japan FTA, which had been set aside recently due to political tensions among the three.20

On November 17, 2014, five days after the APEC summit concluded, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect opened. This is a program that allows investors in each locale to purchase stocks in the other market through registry companies in their home market. There are no restrictions on participants in Hong Kong, so foreigners can take part (PRC participants must have a minimum balance of 500,000 RMB).21 This program effectively doubles existing quotas for foreign investment in the Shanghai market; more

fundamentally, it means that for the first time a foreign individual can purchase

individual stocks on the Shanghai market. Moreover, as regulatory approvals fall into place, it allows direct purchase of mutual funds, ETFs, and other synthetic products. It is an important step in the steady but slow opening of China’s capital market.

Immediately after the APEC summit, an effort was launched to reaffirm and expand the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone (FTZ). In January 2015, it was announced that a total of four FTZs (including Shanghai) would be in operation by March, with many of them expanded in size and scope. The Guangdong FTZ will cover around 120 square

kilometers in the Nansha District of Guangzhou, the Qianhai District in Shenzhen, and the Hengqin District in Zhuhai. The Fujian FTZ will use its close links with Taiwan to develop cross-Strait trade and economic partnerships in producer services and high-end service sectors. The Tianjin FTZ is expected to play an important role in boosting

economic integration given the free-trade agreement with South Korea. It will emphasize

development in emerging industries, finance, and high-end service sectors. The four FTZs will share the same “negative list,” due out by mid-year 2015.

Each of these steps is, in itself, limited. In each policy area, there have been

shortcomings in policy design, and implementation has been far from straightforward. The FTZs, in particular, have been overly cautious and sometimes not very coherent, and the addition of three new FTZs is scarcely likely to change this. Nevertheless, the policies have a common ultimate goal and a cumulative effect. The intention is to

gradually open markets for some high-level service sectors. The gradualist approach, in this case, is designed to give Chinese companies and officials experience that will make them more competitive. The experience sought is of multiple types: experience

responding to the direct competition of foreign service providers; experience for Chinese firms of operating in a hothouse version of the international marketplace in the FTZs; and experience for Chinese regulators in operating in ways consistent with international practice. The first two types of experience are simply extensions of China’s experience with WTO: Chinese firms learned quickly that they could compete with foreign

companies. The final type of experience indicates China’s will to consider broader trade agreements of the type exemplified by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), currently under negotiation between the U.S. and many of its Pacific trading partners. Whether China will ever participate in the TPP remains unclear; what is increasingly likely,

however, is that China will either consider TPP or else pursue competing trade pacts that also involve some type of deep integration, that is, coordination of regulatory and other inside-the-borders rule-making. The measures taken after the APEC summit don’t yet add up to a coherent path to this goal, but they clearly point to that aspiration, while also taking China a few steps in the right direction.

Related, but in a separate category, is the progress made at the APEC meeting on the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which covers the duty-free import and export of information technology hardware. The U.S. and China announced a breakthrough in the breadth of coverage China was willing to accept. This is particularly important, because this is an area in which domestic interest groups in China are aligned with the highest state priorities of economic development and national security. The fact that the Xi government was willing to override some of those interests in pursuit of an agreement with the United States was an important signal about the way Xi views government

techno-industrial policy and his willingness to modify it. At the same time, it also reveals the complexity and intractability of some of the issues. Despite the U.S.-China

agreement, progress on ITA has remained stalled, ironically, by objections from Taiwan and Korea about some of the provisions. Overall, the market environment for U.S. high-tech firms in China has certainly not improved: indeed suspicions about cyber-security and espionage have contributed to a significant deterioration in relations and to much higher barriers to U.S. firms in Chinese technology markets than ever before seen.22

Nothing could better illustrate the risks of the current stage of policy-making. On the one hand, the Chinese government has clearly taken steps toward accepting greater openness in the crucial high-level service sectors that will be the main focus of economic development hereafter in China (and in the world). On the other hand, increased

emphasis on national security and heightened tensions with the United States threaten to

overturn these steps and solidify a protectionist impulse that has been strong in recent years.

Is there a "Xi Model" of Economic Reform?

A number of important characteristic of the economic reform process under Xi Jinping are now emerging. While it may be premature to dub these a Xi Jinping model of reform, these characteristics are prominent enough, and surprising enough, to warrant an attempt to list them here. Determining whether this is a good model of economic reform must be deferred for a later effort. So far, Xi’s economic reform efforts have been characterized by the following features:

1. Reform is top-down and enormous discretion is retained at the top.

In a sense, all of Xi Jinping’s policies involve concentrating power at the top of the political hierarchy, and the emerging economic reforms are no exception. Economic reforms are thus part of a broader authoritarian reform project, designed to reinvigorate institutions and revitalize ideology, but with the unabashed goal of strengthening the system, which is intended to remain authoritarian. The authoritarian nature of the reform project inevitably spills out into some specific reform elements. This is most evident in the fiscal arena. Finance Minister Lou Jiwei is pursuing, with central support, a program that will restrict the heretofore freewheeling behavior of local governments, and will probably end up substantially reducing the financial resources available to local governments. Clearly, this implies that the central government will also take over

additional expenditure responsibilities, which have not yet been delineated. Despite the lip service given to local experimentation in programs like the Shanghai FTZ, we are very far from the pattern in the early days of economic reform (in the 1970s and 1980s) in which bottom-up actions by newly empowered local actors were key drivers of the reform process.23 So far, local governments are less actors and more acted upon, feeling the impact both of the anti-corruption campaign and of the economic reforms announced thus far.

2. There is no reform blueprint. Instead, there is a centrally designed set of

institutions and processes that produce reform outcomes.

This second point may be surprising, given that even before his accession to power, Xi endorsed the idea that there should be a “top-level design” for economic reform, and the Third Plenum proclaimed that its overall reform program would be completed by 2020. However, the vision that is to be realized by 2020 remains extremely murky (for example, with respect to state-enterprise reform) and different groups within Chinese society have very different ideas about what it incorporates. To a certain extent, the absence of a reform blueprint follows from the top-down and authoritarian nature of the reform project. A clear reform blueprint would constrain the leader’s options, and this would not be consistent with Xi’s emphasis on maintaining initiative and discretion at the top. Instead of committing to a blueprint, Xi has established new organizations—headed by himself—that retain discretionary authority over reforms. The most important of these is the Comprehensively Deepen Reform Leadership Small Group (LSG), described

in the previous issue of the Monitor. This group provides an institutional mechanism that ensures that political pressure is sustained and pushes reforms forward on multiple fronts. However, this leadership group doesn’t publish, and probably doesn’t possess, clear objectives for the final state of reform they envision. Instead, reforms are adopted “as they mature,” according to procedures and criteria set in place by the top leadership. Thus, in an area like state-enterprise reform, which everybody agrees is important, but where there is no consensus about the objective, every indication is that it has been quite frustrating to the reform leadership.

The fact that there is no “top-level design” for reform is reflected in the fact that while the term itself continues to be used, it has inevitably been redefined. For example, Han Jun, a rural economy specialist recently elevated to be vice-head of the office of the Comprehensive Reform LSG recently declared that “a series of top-level design policies have already been announced in succession” (一些顶层改革的方案也已经陆续来发布), a conception which completely subverts the original idea of having a single top-level design for reform as a whole.24

3. Specific reform initiatives are likely to be uneven, abrupt, sometimes hasty, and unpredictable.

Progress in reform is likely to be surprisingly thorough and rapid in certain areas, because the foundation has now been laid for rapid movement. Clusters of achievement will emerge when complementarities among policies become evident (as is likely with financial opening and reform); when technocrats are allowed to take the lead, building upon earlier achievements; and in areas where the political commitment of top leaders, especially Xi, is concentrated on an area considered important for national prestige. Moreover, Xi’s span of control is essentially unlimited: decisions of enormous complexity are being presented to him for final disposition on a daily basis. In this situation he will inevitably give preference to clear and quick decisions, which will sometimes be rushed. Conversely, difficult to predict economic shocks may shake the policy commitment to reform, if reforms are seen as risky or threatening to China’s security. The unpredictability of economic reform stems from the fact that it is just one element in Xi’s ambitious bundle of policy changes. Without doubt, in the long run, China cannot hope to be a great power without further economic reforms; in the short run, though, Xi Jinping has many other goals and will constantly be tempted to sacrifice economic reforms for competing objectives.

4. Important elements of the reform program will likely “fly under the radar.”

Of the three areas discussed here, two have been discreetly underplayed by policy-

makers. They don’t make much of an appearance on the Third Plenum’s declaration, and they haven’t made much of a splash in the domestic or international media. Since these policies can be implemented top-down by technocrats, there is no need for the

administration to mobilize popular support for them, and it may be easier to sidestep controversy and undercut opposition.

5. Economic opening will play an important role in the emerging program of

reforms.

Xi’s great power ambitions are clearly a major driver of his policy preferences, and this is true with respect to economic reforms as well. Thus, to a certain extent, the reform agenda is hostage to a reasonably open international economic environment, and

cooperation as well as competition among rivals. There is a deep contradiction between the consistent nationalism of Xi’s policy approach and a genuine opening. This contradiction is manifest in ideological and commercial arenas, but is currently most acute with respect to technology policy. Nobody can predict the ultimate outcome of these deep tensions and contradictions, which might persist for decades. An “external” economic or security event, or a sudden break by China from its recent more cooperative foreign policy positions, may push China policy-makers (that is, Xi) away from the reform agenda. Conversely, an improvement in global conditions will increase the attractiveness of a reform agenda that accepts greater integration with the world economy.

These five characteristics of the emerging Xi model should be considered very

preliminary contributions to a discussion that will be ongoing for years. We can only begin to imagine what the implications will be. An authoritarian regime engaged in a vigorous reform project is very different from an authoritarian regime that is incapable of reforming itself, but it is also very different from a society remaking itself from the

bottom up in a broad-based process of reform and opening. Both those distinctions need to be made. Xi’s approach may be very effective for initiating reform, when the stress must inevitably be on overcoming interest groups and creating new alternatives. However, it makes obviously less sense as a strategy to consolidate reform, that is, to create new institutions that liberate the economy’s productive forces, reliably restrain the hand of government, and contribute to the creation of a just, equitable and creative society.25

Notes 1 Daniel H. Rosen, Avoiding the Blind Alley: China’s Economic Overhaul and Its Global Implications. New York: Asia Society Policy Institute and Rhodium Group, October 2014. Accessed at http://rhg.com/reports/avoiding-the-blind-alley-chinas-economic-overhaul-and-its-global-implications. 2 In other words, until about September 2014, one could reasonably argue that reforms were bogged down, because there were no unambiguous breakthroughs. For example, consider David Shambaugh’s recent statement: “In November 2013, Mr. Xi presided over the party’s Third Plenum, which unveiled a huge package of proposed economic reforms, but so far, they are sputtering on the launchpad.…overall, Mr. Xi’s ambitious goals have been stillborn. The reform package challenges powerful, deeply entrenched interest groups….and they are plainly blocking its implementation.” David Shambaugh, “The Coming Chinese Crackup,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2015. Accessed at

http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-coming-chinese-crack-up-1425659198. Given the most recent developments, those views need to be re-assessed. 3 State Council 国务院, “Opinions on Strengthening Management of Local Government Debt.” (关于加强地方政府性债务管理的意见), State Council Document No. 43 of 2014 (国发〔2014〕43号), dated September 21, 2014; accessed at http://www.gov.cn/zheng ce/content/2014-10/02/content_9111.htm. 4 Han Ji 韩洁, Gao Li 高立, and He Yuxin 何雨欣, “Deep changes that affect the modernization of the nation’s governance system—Minister of Finance Lou Jiwei explains the Overall Program for Deepening Reform of the Fiscal System” (一场关系国家治理现代化的深刻变革——财政部部长楼继伟详解深化财税体制改革总体方案), Xinhua (新华网), July 4, 2014; accessed at http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/20140 7/t20140704_1108534.html. 5 National People Congress Standing Committee 全国人民代表大会常务委员会, “Decision on revising the ‘People’s Republic of China Budget Law’,” (关于修改《中华人民共和国预算法》的决定), August 31, 2014; accessed at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2014-09/01/content_1877061.htm. 6 Xing Yun 邢昀, “Zero Bailout Policy for Local Gov't Debt Leaves Doubts.” Caixin English, October 9, 2014; accessed at http://english.caixin.com/2014-10-

09/100736369.html. The Chinese version includes substantial additional content, “机构：中央不救助原则并非“不兜底”” Caixin (财新网), http://economy.caixin.com/2014-10-08/100735928.html. 7 Investors often perceive bonds from local government funding vehicles as enjoying implicit government guarantees (although there is no legal basis for this belief). In some respects the State Audit Office contributed to this belief by providing an aggregate figure for debt for which local government bore contingent liability. 8 Huo Kan 霍侃, “Detailed explanation of the new policy on local debt that rigorously separates old and new [debt]” (详解地方政府性债务新老划断新政), Caixin (财新网), October 22, 2014, accessed at http://finance.caixin.com/2014-10-22/100741364.html. Ministry of Finance, Department of the Budget, “Methods to inventory and classify the stock of local government debt and integrate it into budgetary management” (地方政府存量债务纳入预算管理清理甄别办法), October 23, 2014. Document number 351, accessed at

http://yss.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/zhengceguizhang/201410/t20141028_1154561.html. 9 It was explicitly stated that Hainan’s numbers would be subject to further review. Xing Yun 邢昀, “The balance of Hainan’s local government debt is 171.9 billion RMB; It’s the only province in the country reporting,” (海南地方债余额1719亿 全国惟一公布), Caixin, February 12, 2015; accessed at http://economy.caixin.com/2015-02-12/100783743.html. 10 The first question directed at Minister of Finance Lou Jiwei at his press conference at the National People’s Congress was exactly this, whether there would be a big jump in local government indebtedness because local governments were shifting from minimizing to maximizing their debt statements. Minister Lou praised the questioner for his

understanding of the psychology of local governments. “Minister of Finance Answers Reporters’ Questions on Fiscal Work and Fiscal and Tax Reform” (财政部就“财政工作和财税改革”答记者问), March 6, 2015, Xinhuanet; accessed at

http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2015qglhzb/zb06.htm. Also see Xing Yun 邢昀, “Ministry of Finance requires localities to self-audit their debt figures”

(财政部要求地方自查债务数据), Caixin, February 12, 2015, accessed at

http://economy.caixin.com/2015-02-12/100783734.html. Yang Zhijin 杨志锦, “The results of the first provincial government debt inventory and reclassification are available” (首个省级政府性债务清理甄别结果出炉), 21st Century Economic Herald (21 世纪经济报道), February 11, 2015; accessed at http://www.cs.com.cn/xwzx/jr/2

01502/t20150211_4645186.html. 11 For example, in the pace and procedures through which rural land is converted to urban land. While pilot programs have begun in these respects, they are not particularly radical, even as pilots. See Li Yue 李乐, “Differences of opinion about the ‘new land reform’ still haven’t been bridged over; Pilot programs of the Ministry of Land tend to be safe returning to conservative” (新土改分歧未弥合 国土部试点趋向稳妥回归保守), 中国经营报 (China Business Journal), February 13, 2015; accessed at http://finance.sina.com.cn/ china/20150213/[1**********]0.shtml. 12 Chinese Communist Party Central Office and State Council Office (中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅), “Opinions on guiding the orderly transference of rural land management rights and developing appropriate scale management,” (关于引导农村土地经营权有序流转发展农业适度规模经营的意见), November 20, 2014, Xinhua Newsnet (新华网); accessed at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-11/20/c_1113339197.htm. 13 Zhong Qing 种卿, “State Council issues document regularizing rural property rights exchanges; land contracting rights are not to be transferred” (国务院发文规范农村产权交易 土地承包权不得流转), January 23, 2015, China Newsnet (中国新闻网); accessed at http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2015/01-23/6996832.shtml. 14 Chinese Communist Center and State Council (中共中央、国务院), “Several Opinions on increasing the intensity of reform innovation and accelerating agricultural modernized construction” (关于加大改革创新力度加快农业现代化建设的若干意见), February 1, 2015; accessed at http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20150201/[1**********]9.shtml. 15 The relevant passages are 重点是抓紧抓实土地承包经营权确权登记颁证工作 (Section 22) and 抓紧修改农村土地承包 方面的法律，明确现有土地承包关系保持稳定并长久不变的具体实现形式，界定农村土地集体所有权、农户承包权、土地经营权之间的权利关系，保障好农村妇女的 土地承包权益 (Section 28). 16 The Guardian at least recognized that the No. 1 document had potentially newsworthy content, but unfortunately completely failed to see the significance of it. See Jonathan Kaiman, “China’s urban sprawl raises key question: Can it feed its people?” The Guardian, February 15, 2015; accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/

feb/16/china-mega-airport-symbol-flight-agriculture-urbanisation. Kaiman reports of the No. 1 document that “its main targets read like a socialist-utopia checklist: modern, industrialised farms, clean water and soil, sophisticated rural infrastructure, and farmers prosperous enough that they won’t abandon their fields. All are intended to improve China’s food safety and food security situations; none came as a surprise.” This is wrong in so many different ways it’s hard to know where to begin. Mr. Kaiman also seems to be laboring under the bizarre misconception that the construction of a second airport near Beijing will threaten the food security of Beijing residents. 17Xi Jinping 习近平, “Seek sustainable development; jointly build the Asia-Pacific Dream”(谋求持久发展 共筑亚太梦想). Opening Speech at the APEC Summit, Beijing,

November 9, 2014; accessed at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1109/c64094-25999796.html. 18 “Korea-China FTA: ‘Low-level’ Agreement But Big Impact Expected,” Korea

Economic Daily, November 11, 2014. “Korea-China FTA Minimizes Shocks to Farmers and Fishermen in Both Countries,” Korea Economic Daily, February 26, 2015; accessed at http://english.hankyung.com/news/apps/news.view?popup=0&nid=0&c1=01&newsca te=1&nkey=[**************]. 19 This concession was not granted to Korea in the Korea-China agreement. John Garnaut, “Australia scores 'most favoured nation' provisions in FTA with China,” The Age, March 13, 2015; accessed at http://www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australia-scores-most-favoured-nation-provisions-in-fta-with-china-20150312-141w3o.html. On the China-Australia FTA, see Minister for Trade and Investment, Australia, “Landmark China-Australia Free Trade Agreement,” November 17, 2014, accessed at http://trademinister.gov.au/releases/Pages

/2014/ar_mr_141117.aspx. See also the various fact sheets on the agreement available at http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/fact-sheets/Pages/understanding-the-agreement.aspx. 20 “Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng Responds to Reporters’ Questions” (商务部部长高虎城答记者提问), March 7, 2015, Xinhuanet; accessed at http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/20 15qglhzb/zb10.htm. 21 Shanghai Stock Exchange, “Definition and Development: Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect,” N.D.; accessed at http://english.sse.com.cn/investors/shhkconnect/introduction /definition/. See also the Wikipedia entry “Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect,” accessed at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai-Hong_Kong_Stock_Connect. 22 Jane Perlez and Paul Mozur, “In China, Suspicions Cloud Trade Dispute Involving Tech Companies,” New York Times, February 27, 2015, accessed at http://www.nytimes.c om/2015/02/28/technology/in-china-suspicions-cloud-trade-dispute-involving-tech-companies.html. 23 For analyses of this early dynamic, see Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 24 Han Jun 韩俊. “The State Information Office press conference explains Central Document No. 1 for 2015” (国新办发布会解读2015年中央一号文件), February 3, 2015; accessed at http://www.xinhuanet.com/live/20150203z/. 25 For the distinction between initiating reform and consolidating reform, see Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 9–10.