中美之间不是零和博弈

Op-Ed Contributors

Where Commerce and Politics Collide

By IAN BREMMER and DAVID GORDON October 09, 2012

观点

中美之间不是零和博弈

伊恩·布雷默, 戴维·戈登 2012年10月09日

Whatever happened to the reassuring view that expanding trade ties make for a safer and more prosperous world? This idea has been long present in U.S. strategies toward China, even before being concretized in Robert Zoellick’s notion of integrating China into the world financial and commercial systems as a way of promoting “responsible stakeholdership.”

曾经有一种令人安心的观点，认为扩大贸易联系有助于世界的和平与繁荣。这种观点如今怎么没有人提了呢？在美国的对华战略中，这个观点长期存在。甚至在罗伯特·佐利克(Robert Zoellick)的观念将其明确化之前，它就存在了。佐利克认为，使中国融入世界金融和商业体系中去，可以促进建立“负责任的利益相关人关系”。

The Chinese had a parallel concept — that promoting economic interdependence with America would counter Washington’s natural tendency to block China’s rise as an alternative power.

中国人也持有一种类似的观念——认为促进同美国在经济上的相互依赖可以抵制美国的一种想要遏制中国崛起的本能倾向。

But as President Obama and Governor Mitt Romney argue over who can be tougher on China and its trade practices, and as a wave of anti-American nationalism surges across China, the commercial partnership meant to bring Washington and Beijing closer together appears to be pushing the world’s two largest economies further apart. Are we headed for some new form of Cold War-style confrontation?

然而，随着奥巴马总统和米特·罗姆尼(Mitt Romney)州长争论谁对中国及其贸易做法更强硬，而反美的民族主义浪潮又在席卷中国，本来应该进一步拉近美国和中国之间的距离的商业伙伴关系好像正在让这两个全球最大的经济体渐行渐远。我们是在走向一种新的冷战式对抗吗？

We don’t think so. Behind all the finger-pointing and fist-shaking on both sides is a powerful economic interdependence that constrains both countries and was totally missing from U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. What’s bad for one economy is still bad for the other, and both Washington and Beijing know it.

我们不这么认为。在双方所有的相互指责和威胁背后，有一种经济上强有力的相互依赖。这种相互依赖关系约束着双方，在冷战期间的美苏关系中，是完全不存在这种相互依存的。对一个经济体不利的东西也不利于另外一个经济体，华盛顿和北京都深知这一点。

With trillions invested in U.S. Treasuries, and the continuing sluggishness of American consumer spending, China has a huge stake in a more robust U.S. recovery. And the prospect of a rapidly growing consumer sector in China creates enormous opportunities for American agriculture and industry.

鉴于中国在美国国债上投进了几万亿，且美国的消费者支出持续低靡，因此，美国经济更加强劲的复苏对中国有巨大的利害关系。而中国消费领域快速增长的前景也将为美国的农业和工业创造大量机遇。

But macro-economic interdependence brings with it a whole range of tactical tensions — over exchange rates, intellectual property, investment rules and standard-setting. Yet there is also a more strategic downside to mutually assured economic destruction, because neither side has perfect control over events that might undermine the relationship, and because reduced risk of all-out conflict lets them feel freer to play with fire.

然而，宏观经济上的相互依赖本身也带来了诸多战术上的紧张关系——围绕汇率、知识产权、投资规则以及标准设置等方面的紧张关系。不过，经济上的两败俱伤关系也有一个战略上的负面效果：因为两国都不能完全掌控有可能削弱双方关系的事件，也因为爆发全面冲突的风险的降低让他们觉得可以更加有恃无恐地玩火。

There are a growing number of security risks around the world. In Asia, an expanding U.S. security and commercial presence has China’s next generation of leaders on edge, and Beijing finds itself in various forms of direct conflict with many of its neighbors, some of whom are America’s strategic allies. In the Middle East, a variety of new actors with competing agendas are jostling to fill emerging power vacuums. In Europe, Germany has taken a leadership role in what is sure to emerge as a quite different continent. In Russia’s sphere of influence, a government that faces rising risks at home may well respond more aggressively abroad.

全球面临着越来越多的安全风险。在亚洲，美国不断扩大的军事和商业存在让中国下一代领导人紧张不安，而中国也发现自己身陷同众多邻国之间各种形式的直接冲突中，其中的一些国家正是美国战略上的盟友。在中东，各种新势力怀着彼此冲突的动机展开了角逐，都想去填补新出现的权力真空。欧洲注定要经历一番改头换面。德国成了新盟主。而在俄罗斯的势力范围内，该国政府正面临着不断增长的国内危机，因此很有可能在外交上表现得更加咄咄逼人。

In the past, these sorts of tectonic geopolitical shifts and the uncertainty they create might well have provoked war. But today, the economic dimension is at least as important as military muscle in shaping the balance of power. That makes for more complicated international relationships.

若是在过去，这些重大的地缘政治转变和它们导致的不确定性很可能已经引发了战争。然而今天，在塑造国际均势上，经济维度至少是和军事力量同等重要的。这让国际关系愈发复杂。

Look more closely at the contradictions. A military rivalry is a zero-sum relationship; what’s good for one side is bad for the other. But economic security is good for both. America and China both need oil to flow smoothly from the Middle East and for peace to prevail in the South China Sea. Deepening trade relations give each side a stake in the other’s success.

进一步细看这一矛盾。军事对抗是一种零和关系；一方得利，另一方就会受损。而经济安全却对双方都有利。中美两国都需要中东石油输出顺畅，也都需要保证南海地区和平。不断加深的贸易关系使得两国利益攸关，一方成功也有利于另一方。

As China and Japan bicker over territorial disputes, both sides are trying to exploit local resentments for political gain. But they share an overriding incentive to protect a deepening economic partnership that reinforces stability at home by enriching them both. Similarly, Turkey and Iran are backing different sides in Syria, but neither will let their bilateral relationship deteriorate too sharply; Iran needs Turkey to go easy on enforcement of sanctions, and Turkey needs Iran to continue selling its natural gas.

当中国和日本因领土矛盾拌嘴时，中日双方都试图利用本国的仇恨情绪，从中牟取政治利益。但是，双方都有一个凌驾于一切之上的动机，都要保护中日之间日益加深的经济伙伴关系，因为这种伙伴关系可以使两国富裕，从而使两国国内局势稳定。同样，土耳其和伊朗各自支持不同的叙利亚势力，但是双方都不会让双边关系过于恶化；伊朗需要土耳其在制裁上对其手下留情，而土耳其要继续购买伊朗的天然气。

However, there are two important reasons why this is not as good as it appears. First, the assurance that all-out war has become so unlikely encourages governments to flirt with economically damaging lower-level conflicts.

然而，这一切并非像看上去的那么美好。有两个原因：首先，由于全面开战不太可能，各国政府便感到有恃无恐，冒险展开有害于经济的低层次冲突。

If U.S.-China trade relations spiral into various forms of confrontation, the risk of proxy battles in cyberspace will rise sharply, and a more aggressive Chinese approach to territorial disputes with Vietnam, the Philippines and others could draw Washington into fights it hopes to avoid.

如果中美贸易关系陷入各种形式的对抗，网络上发生代理人战争的可能性就会急剧上升。而如果在同越南、菲律宾等国的领土争端中，中国采取更加激进的方式，华盛顿也会陷入其本想避免的争斗。

If Iran tries to undermine Turkey’s opposition to Syria’s government by offering clandestine support for Kurdish separatists inside Turkey, the trouble between Ankara and Tehran could escalate to levels that neither can manage. Regional war in Asia or the Middle East remains extremely unlikely, but a constant state of tension will have an economic impact.

如果伊朗为了瓦解土耳其对叙利亚政府的反对，而为土耳其内部的库尔德分裂分子提供秘密支持的话，安卡拉和德黑兰之间的问题就会升级到双方都不可控制的程度。亚洲或中东仍然极不可能发生区域战争，但是持续的紧张局势会影响经济。

Second, conflicts can take on a life of their own. Beijing may discover over time that it’s becoming much more difficult to keep a lid on the crowds it riles up for geopolitical advantage, and Japanese leaders may talk themselves into conflicts from which they can’t easily back down. Arab world animosities may grow beyond the ability of inexperienced new governments to control.

其次，冲突可能会发生意料之外的变异。久而久之，中国政府会发现， 本来为了地缘政治利益而煽动起来的愤怒民众会变得难以控制。日本领导人可能会让自己卷入难以自拔的冲突。阿拉伯世界的仇恨可能会升级，超出没有经验的新政府的控制能力。

Governments around the world face much more complicated challenges than the Cold War could offer, and economic interdependence can create joint vulnerability. The risk of superpower nuclear war is much lower, but there is little to protect one side’s security from volatility on the other.

世界各国政府面临的挑战，比冷战时期要复杂得多，而经济上的互相依赖，可能会形成各国共同的弱点。发生超级大国核战争的可能性非常小。但是，如果一方局势动荡多变，另一方的安全也很难保证。

Following the leadership transition in Beijing and the presidential election in America, both China and the United States need to reinvigorate their top-level dialogue, and pay more attention to ensuring that domestic politics does not overcome the incentives for conflict avoidance that mutually assured economic destruction has created.

经济上两败俱伤的关系决定了国家有规避冲突的动机。在中国领导层换届及美国总统大选之后，两国都需要恢复高层对话，并更加注意，避免国内政治凌驾于规避冲突的动机之上。

Ian Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group and author of “Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World.”David Gordon is head of research at Eurasia Group and former director of policy planning at the State Department.

伊恩·布雷默(Ian Bremmer)是欧亚集团(Eurasia Group)总裁，也是《各自为政：零国集团世界中的赢家与输家》(Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World)的作者。戴维德·戈登(David Gordon)是欧亚集团的研究中心主任，并曾任美国国务院政策规划主任。

翻译：陈亦婷、梁英