毕业论文:XX企业薪酬管理及对策研究

ZHEJIANG SHUREN UNIVERSITY

《学科前沿文献读写议》课程作业

学生姓名：姚滢

学 号：[1**********]2

专 业：工商管理

班 级：工本103

浙江树人大学管理学院

2013年11月

毕业论文题目：XX企业薪酬管理及对策研究

英文文献原文：

Wage and Salary Administration and Wage

Theory: A Reconciliation

By MAURICE C. BENEWITZ

MANY INDUSTRIAL WAGE and salary administrators believe that they can determine wage and employment levels for their firms by use of criteria different from those of economic wage theory. Industrial programs differ from the approach of marginal theory mainly in their failure to employ the economic criterion of value productivity of labor. This paper will contend that revenue (or value) productivity does, nevertheless, dominate the activities of operating firms with respect to wage rates and employment levels. Therefore, it will be argued, wage theory describes more fully the forces affecting firm decisions than does wage and salary administration analysis.

Both the wage theorist and the business firm seek to determine:

1. relative wage structures within the firm;

2. the absolute dollar wage which will be paid for each type of labor employed in the firm;

3. minimum labor cost per unit of output (for whatever output is chosen) within the limits imposed by techniques and availability of of other sources;

4. the proper level of employment within the firm.

The operating firm and the firm in the economic model determine these magnitudes in similar ways if allowances are made for the restrictions placed upon the

businessman by lack oi data, presence of frictions, and the like. This similarity of solutions is not always apparent, however, because functions which are combined in a single process in the economic model are scattered among a number of administrators in the medium- or large size firm.

In the model, the entrepreneur hires labor and other resources, directs the production process, decides upon the combination of products to be produced, engages in the sale of product, and undertakes future planning for these procedures. All of these activities are involved in the determination of wage rates and the level of employment.

These procedures are scattered among a number of administrators in the medium- or larged firm. Administrators of particular firm activities may not be aware that the overall operation of the firm closely adheres to the theoretical model.

In this paper the relationship between wage theory and the whole of the operating firm's activities will be demonstrated. Wage and salary programs will first be examined. Then the method of setting wage rates and employment levels in theory will be discussed. The apparent discrepancies between methods will be set forth, and

finally, a reconciliation between the theoretical and operating methods will be suggested.

Wage and salary administration, it should be noted, accepts as given the wage rate or the supply function for each type of labor in the market. Industrial wage programs make no attempt, even implicitly, to explain the supply conditions or to answer those questions about wages and labor allocation which depend upon such an explanation. This is true despite the fact that industrial relations practitioners appear to believe that their functions include the setting of wages. Wage theory does attempt to explain the nature oi the supply relationship or, at least, to take account of variations in supply. It seeks to solve a larger set of problems. But even in theory, supply relationships are assumed to be parameters for the individual firm. In this paper, the theoretical model will be limited to the level of the firm. Given wage rates or given supply relationships will be assumed so that the solutions under theory and under wage and salary administration can be compared.

Solution in the Operating Firm

WAGE AND SALARY ADMINISTRATION seeks to achieve equitable relative wage structures within the firm, a wage structure which is comparable with those of similar firms, and minimum unit labor costs for given outputs. (The firm is, of course, not interested in minimization of unit cost for any one factor. However, if it is

assumed that labor is the major controllable factor in the short-run, then minimization of unit labor costs iot whatever output is chosen turns out to be the best method of minimizing unit cost.)

Salary Administration and Wage Theory

Under wage and salary administration, internal equity in the wage and salary structure is achieved by use of job analysis and job evaluation, to describe jobs and then to arrange them in order of their importance within the firm. After analyzing every job in the plant, factors common to all, such as skill requirements, working conditions, and effort requirements, are then selected as norms used in the evaluation process by which the jobs are ranked. The relative importance of the jobs is

established by comparison of all jobs against these norms. This relative order is the firm's job structure.

Pricing of this job structure translates the relative position of jobs in the structure into dollar terms and makes the firm's wage structure comparable to those of similar firms. The usual pricing procedure employed is the wage survey which establishes the basic rates (or range of rates) paid for particular kinds of work in the same labor

market. The wage survey is undertaken only for a relatively small number of key jobs and the data are reduced to a least-squares line, relating job evaluation points of

surveyed jobs and wage-rates of these jobs. The wage-rates for non-surveyed jobs are determined by finding the wage-rate associated on the trend line with the evaluation points of each particular job. If the key jobs are well chosen and the survey is properly conducted, the wage structure should be similar to that of all other firms using the same types of labor in an area or labor market.

Within the firm, the wage and salary structure deals with the relative differences between jobs as shown by differences in the compensation of the various jobs. In

contrast, the labor cost structure of the firm deals with

the expenditure on labor per unit of output for different products and for varying outputs of a single product.

One of the basic aims of the wage and salary program is prediction of total labor cost for budgeting purposes. To achieve this end, specific, and often different,

methods are used to compensate different groups. This occurs because in practice the measurement of the productivity of various

groups presents differing problems. In the case of direct production workers, for

example, the wage paid can be associated with the output of the individual or group in at least an approximate manner and budgeting can be based on planned output. But even where measurement is possible;

the units in which productivity is measured may differ. Thus, the contribution of direct production workers is measured in terms of output while contributions of salesmen are usually measured in dollar volume of sales. Such differences in

measurement units make necessary varying methods of payment. For other groups of employees the compensation problem is complicated by the difficulty of direct unit measurement of the contribution. Executives and some indirect production employees and office employees are examples. In such cases, the budget is sometimes

established first, and incentive scales are set against the production norms shown in the budget. Of course, such compensation procedures do not aid in planning the budget.

Reduction of labor costs is another important wage and salary function. When

productivity increases, labor cost per unit oi output is reduced. Incentive pay methods related to output are needed if increases in productivity are to be encouraged by monetary means. As noted above, such incentive methods can be applied to some groups in the firm but are difficult to apply to others. W. H. Knowles has shown that the choice among incentive systems cannot be made on any scientific grounds.

The Solution in the Economic Model

How DOES THE THEORIST approach the solution of the same problems? The economist operates under the simplyifing assumption that the value of the output of all types of labor can be measured in the same way. He reduces the value of the

product of all workers to a single, homogeneous measure, marginal revenue product, the increase in the total value of the firm's output resulting from the output of the last labor unit employed. To derive this measure in actual business practice would involve several difficult problems. One problem, which has already been discussed above, is the difficulty of measuring the output contribution of many types of labor employed in the firm. In addition, the valuation oi the product depends upon estimates of the value the output will have when it is placed upon the market at some time in the

future. The use of the marginal revenue product concept as a measuring device would be difficult in business practice because of these and other problems inherent in its construction; but the concept is theoretically useful.

In place of a wage structure designed to achieve equity, the economist substitutes a wage structure based upon the production contributions of the various kinds of labor employed. The quantities of the different types

of labor hired within the model firm are varied until the marginal revenue product of each type employed equals its wage rate. In the short-run, when the labor force of the plant is not completely variable, this result may not be entirely achieved. The firm in the model will attempt to approximate it as closely as possible. (The criteria used in job analysis and job evaluation to achieve an "internally equitable" job and wage structure include skills, physical working conditions and so on; but they do not include revenue productivity of labor.)

In the economic model, the comparability of wage structures of employers in the same labor markets is the result of the impact of the forces of supply and demand upon all employers. (In the case under discussion, the supply

schedules for employers are assumed to be given; only the demand schedules are to be explained in the following discussion.) In the wage and salary program, on the other hand, comparability of wage structures between firms is achieved through the wage survey; that is, equalization appears to be a policy decision rather than a result of market forces.

A Contrasting of Methods

BOTH THE BUSINESSMAN and the economist are agreed that wages are ultimately based on the value of production. When the supply schedule of labor is accepted as given, the economist seeks to explain compensation of labor on the basis of the following factors; physical output of labor, market demand for goods produced (which determines the value of physical product), effectiveness of other resources, and a host of other variables which help to determine the demand schedule for labor. In short, this explanation is based on value productivity in the firm, industry, and society.

In contrast, the wage and salary administrator does not attempt to explain the forces which determine the nature of the demand schedule for labor of various types. This schedule in fact exists for the firm and is roughly equated to the given supply relationships, but the wage and salary administrator handles only a portion of the information needed to construct the demand schedule.

Under wage theory, the firm managers in the model adjust production so as to equate the marginal revenue product of each grade of labor to the market wage or to the marginal costs of hiring one more unit of labor. In the short-run, such adjustment results from changing the number of persons employed, speed of the work process, or the product mix produced. In the long-run, more basic adjustments may be achieved by revamping the production process so as to change the utilization of various kinds of labor or other resources.

In the firm found in the economic model, therefore, wages serve as a guide to the proper number of employees to hire. Furthermore, the productivity in each firm helps to set the market demand schedules for the various grades of labor and, thus, the market wage rate. Within the firm, this process also serves to minimize per unit labor costs for whatever output is chosen (assuming labor to be the major controllable factor in the short-run.)

Just as the basic wage rate and any differentials and incentives paid under an actual wage and salary program do not appear to be nearly so directly related to productivity

as they are in the economic model, neither does the employment level appear to be so directly associated with the wage for each labor grade. Under job evaluation programs found in industry, and in the wage surveys conducted, productivity is not measured. In fact, the task standard is set through time and motion study or by use of standard data only after the wage rate has been determined. The measurement, when made, is

usually in terms of physical product rather than value product. Incentive payments are related to increased physical productivity in most cases, and the amount of increased pay is related to the base rate. Thus, even in the case of incentive pay, there is only a distant relationship between payments made and value productivity. This is also true in the case of "fringe" adjustment. It would not appear that the wage and salary administration method can explain why a given wage is paid as well as wage theory does.

It would also appear that the wage and salary administration method cannot determine the number of workers of each grade to hire because of the lack of value productivity data to compare with cost. The economist equates the marginal revenue product of each grade of labor to the appropriate wage rate or marginal cost schedule in order to find that level of employment of each group which is most profitable. It does not appear that considerations concerning the demand schedule influence the employment level or wage-rates of the firm in actual business practice.

A Reconciliation of Methods

THIS ANALYSIS SEEMS to show that wage and salary administration cannot perform either of the important functions which wage theory is assumed to accomplish:

1. the explanation of wage levels on the basis of productivity and the value of output in the economy as a whole;

2. the explanation of the level of employment for each labor grade

on the basis of comparisons between the costs of hiring labor and the returns from the use of labor.

If wage and salary administration cannot do these things in at least the

rough-and-ready way which is applicable to the non-theoretical business community, it would appear to be a costly, and not overly useful management technique. If, however, wage and salary administration actually provides the firm with data which substantially enhance the efficiency of the firm's operations, then the economist must be able to show the relationship between wage and salary administration and wage theory. Otherwise present wage theory must be an inadequate explanation of even an idealized model of business procedures in hiring and compensating manpower. In the remaining portion of this paper, an attempt is made to show that a relationship does exist between wage and salary administration and wage theory.

William Gomberg, writing on job evaluation, stated the essential problem which must be solved. He questioned the usefulness of job evaluation because after the evaluation process, the firm goes into the market to find the wage which it must pay on key jobs. The market seems to set the wage in spite of job analysis and job

evaluation. Gomberg's view is correct, and the wage and salary technique is not very useful, if the process is supposed to set the wage rates for the surveyed jobs.

Evaluation does not and cannot acomplish this end because of the lack of value

productivity data in the system. I wish to suggest that setting of the wage rates on key jobs is not the object of the job evaluation procedure.

Much of the problem of relating wage and salary administration and wage theory disappears if job analysis and job evaluation are considered as procedures for

specifying exactly the various kinds of labor the firm will have to hire. The function of job evaluation is not to determine the wage which will be offered for each of these categories of labor. On the contrary, it is the market which sets the rate for the

surveyed jobs since the firm must pay the going market wage rates (or a wage within the range of going rates) if it hopes to attract labor. Job and wage structures, seen m this light, arc not methods of setting wages for key jobs. Job analysis and job cvaluation describe the specific kinds of labor needed in the firm and the market indicates the wage rates which must be offered in order to attract the needed kinds of workers in the necessary numbers.

文献翻译：

工资和薪酬管理和工资理论：和解

作者：MAURICE C. BENEWITZ

许多工业工资和薪金管理者认为，他们可以通过使用不同的标准工资的经济理论为自己的企业确定工资和就业水平。工业项目不同于边际理论的方法主要在于他们失败的雇佣劳动价值的生产力的经济标准。本文认为收入（或价值）的生产力，然而，主导经营企业的是工资率和就业水平。因此，它会说，工资理论比工资和工资管理分析更能充分地描述影响公司决策的力量。

薪酬理论家和商业公司寻求确定：

1．在公司内的相对工资结构;

2．绝对美元将支付受聘于该公司各类型的劳动的工资;

3．每单位产出的最低劳动力成本（任何输出选择）的技术和其他来源可用性的限制;

4．在公司内的就业水平适当。

经营企业和公司的经济模型中以类似的方式，确定这些津贴是由缺乏数据放置于商人的限制，存在的摩擦，以及类似。这种相似性的解决方案并不总是很明显的，然而，因为功能结合在一个单一的经济模式的过程中散落的管理者—一些行政人员或大型企业。

在该模型中，企业家雇佣劳动和其他资源，生产过程模型，决定产品的组合产生，从事产品的销售，并承诺为这些程序的未来规划。所有这些活动所涉及的工资率和就业水平的测定。

这些程序是分散在许多行政人员或一些大型企业中的。公司管理人员的特别活动可能没有意识到，企业整体运营紧贴理论模型。

在本文中的工资关系理论和整体之间的经营公司的活动将展示，工资计划首先会检查。然后设置工资和就业的方法水平的理论讨论会。明显的差异方法将列，最后，之间的和解 理论和操作方法将建议。

工资管理，应当指出，接受了工资率或供给函数为每个类型的劳动在市场。工业的工资程序没有尝试，甚至暗示，解释供应情况或回答这些关于工资和劳动力资源配置的问题这取

决于这样的一种解释。这是真正的尽管事实劳动关系的从业人员似乎相信他们功能包括工资的设置。工资理论试图解释自然油的供应关系，或至少考虑到变化的供应，它旨在解决更大的问题。但即使在理论上，供应关系被认为是为单个的参数公司，但本文的理论模型中，是有限公司层面的。给定的工资率或特定供应关系会假定这样的解决方案在理论和工资管理下可以比较。

在经营企业的解决方案

工资管理旨在在企业内实现公平的相对工资结构，工资结构与类似的公司比较，和最小的单位劳动力成本给定的输出。（当然，公司不是在单位成本最小化兴趣的任何一个因素。然而，如果假定劳动是主要控制的短期因素，然后最小化的单位劳动成本的物联网无论是选择输出结果还是最小化的最佳方法—单位成本。）

薪酬管理和工资理论

工资管理机制下，薪酬内部公平性和薪酬结构是通过工作分析和岗位评价来实现的，以描述工作然后按顺序安排他们的重要性。在工厂的每一个职位分析，所有的共同因素，如技能要求，工作条件，工作要求，然后在评价过程中选择标准进行工作排名。用工作的相对重要性对所有的工作与这些规范进行比较，这是该公司的相对顺序工作结构。

这项工作的定价在结构的相对位置的工作结构为金钱，使企业的工资结构与类似的公司比较。常用的定价方法是工资调查奠定了基本利率（或范围的利率）支付在相同的劳动力市场的特定种类的工作。工资调查只进行一个相对小的数目的关键工作和数据减少到一个最小二乘线，有关调查工作评价点工作，这些工作的工资率。非调查工作的工资率被发现关联在趋势线与工资率的确定每一个特定的工作点的评价。如果关键的工作是很好的选择和调查方法得当，工资结构对所有使用在一个地区或劳动劳动同类型的其他公司市场应该是相似的。

在公司内部，工资和薪金与结构研究差异显示工作的薪酬差异不同的工作。相反，与该公司的交易成本结构支出在单位产出劳动对于不同的产品和不同的输出的单品。

预测是一个的工资程序的基本目标编制预算的目的总劳动成本。实现这一目标，具体的，和以往不同，方法是用来补偿不同组的。因此在实践中出现的各种生产力的测量组提出了不同的问题。在直接生产的情况工人，例如，工资可以与输出相关的个人或团体中的至少一个近似的方式和预算可以根据计划产量。但即使在测量是可能的；单位的生产率是衡量可能不同。因此，直接生产工人的贡献是衡量产出时贡献的推销员通常以销售美元量测量。在测量单位的差异做出必要的改变方法付款。对于其他群体员工的补偿问题复杂的直接贡献单位计量的困难。高管和一些间接员工和办公室的员工的例子。在这种情况下，有时是建立预算首先，激励尺度与显示在生产规范预算。当然，这样的补偿程序不援助计划预算。

劳动力成本的减少是另一重要的工资和薪金的功能。当提高生产率，降低单位劳动成本的OI输出。激励支付相关的输出方式，如果需要增加生产力是由货币手段鼓励。如上所述，激励的方法可以应用到公司的一些团体中，但困难像W·H·诺里斯已经表明，在激励选择系统无法用任何科学依据。

经济模式的解决方案

理论家的方法，如何用相同的解决方案？经济学家假设值下运行所有类型的劳动力的输出可以以同样的方式测量。他降低了所有工人到一个单一的产品的价值，均匀的测量，边际收益产品，在总价值增加公司的产量从上劳动部队使用的输出。在实际的业务实践中得到这项措施将涉及几个困难的问题。一个问题，已经讨论以上，有许多类型的劳动产出的贡献测量的难度受雇于公司。此外，评估的产品取决于在估计值的输出会有当放在未来一段时间的市场。使用的边际收益在业务实践中，作为测量装置的产品概念将难以由于这些和其他问题在其结构固有的，但理论上的概念是有用的。

在一个工资结构设计实现公平的地方，经济学家替代的工资结构基于雇佣的劳动生产各

类捐款。不同类型的数量劳动模型内的公司雇佣了变化，直到边际收益各类型产品等于工资率。在短期内，当工厂的劳动力是不可变的，这样的结果可能不完全实现。模型中的企业将尝试近似尽可能地。（使用的标准工作分析和工作评价实现一个“内部公平”的工作和工资结构包括技能，体育工作条件等；但不包括收入劳动生产率。）

在经济模型，对雇主的工资结构的相似性在相同的劳动力市场的供给力影响的结果并要求所有雇主。（在案例讨论，供应计划的雇主假设只需求计划；可以在下面的讨论解释。）在工资和薪金程序，另一方面，工资结构之间的相似性公司通过调查取得的工资，均衡的出现；是一个决策，而不是一个结果的市场力量。

对比的方法

无论是商人和经济学家都认为，工资最后基于生产价值。当电源计划劳动是公认的，经济学家试图解释补偿劳动的基础上的下列因素的物理输出劳动力，生产的产品的市场需求（这决定了体育的价值产品），其他资源的有效性，和许多其他变量这有助于确定劳动需求表。总之，这的解释是基于公司价值的生产力，产业，与社会。

相反，工资和薪金的管理员并不试图解释的力量决定的需求计划的性质各种类型的劳动。这个计划实际上存在的公司，大致等同于给定的供应关系，但工资管理员处理只需要构建信息的一部分需求表。

在工资理论，模型中的企业管理者调整生产从而把每一级劳动的边际收益产品的市场工资或雇佣一个单位劳动的边际成本。在短期内，这样的调整结果变化的人数就业，工作过程的速度，或产品的组合产生。在长期中，更基本的调整可以通过改造生产过程，从而改变各种劳动的利用或其他资源。

在公司发现在经济模式，因此，工资作为指导员工正确数量的雇佣。此外，生产力在每一个企业，有助于对市场需求的时间表各种档次的劳动，因此，市场工资率。在公司，这个过程也有助于减少任何输出的每单位劳动力成本选择（假设劳动是在主要的可控因素短期的。）

正如基本工资率和任何差异和激励下支付实际工资的计划似乎不那么直接相关的生产力作为他们在经济模式，也不就业水平显得那么直接与工资相关的各劳动等级。工作评估计划在下的产业，并在工资调查，生产率不测。事实上，这项任务标准是通过时间和动作研究或通过使用标准的数据只有在已确定的工资率。测量时，制成的，通常是在物理产品方面，而不是价值的产品。奖励是在大多数物质生产力增加有关例，和数额的增加工资是基准利率的关系。因此，即使在薪酬激励的情况下，只有一个遥远的关系之间存在支付和生产力价值。这中情况也是如此“边缘”调整。它不会出现，工资和薪金管理方法可以解释为什么一个给定的工资以及工资理论。

它也将出现的工资管理方法无法确定各等级的工人数量因为雇用的生产力价值缺乏数据的比较成本。经济学家相当于每一级劳动的边际收益产品到适当的工资率和边际成本表来发现水平每一组的这是最有利可图的就业。它不会出现这方面的考虑，要求安排就业的影响在实际的业务实践中企业层面或工资率。

和解的方法

这样的分析似乎表明，工资管理不能履行的重要职能工资理论假定完成：

1.工资水平对生产力的基础上解释经济的产出价值作为一个整体；

2.对每一级劳动就业水平的解释对雇佣劳动的成本之间的比较的基础上从劳动的使用效益。

如果工资管理不能做这些事情，至少在粗略的方法适用于非理论的业务社区，这似乎是一个昂贵的，和不太有用的管理技术。如果，然而，实际工资管理提供的数据，大大提高了企业效率公司的运营，那么经济学家必须显示的关系与即使工资管理和工资理论。否则目前的工资理论必须解释不足甚至理想在招聘和人力资源业务流程模型补偿。在本文的其余部

分，试图证明关系是工资管理和工资之间存在理论。

威廉伯格，在岗位评价中所写，最根本的问题这是必须要解决的问题。他质疑有用的工作评价因为评估过程之后，该公司进入市场找到它必须支付工资的关键工作。市场似乎集工资虽然工作分析和工作评价。伯格的观点是正确的，和工资的技术是非常有用的，如果这个过程应该设置为调查工作的工资率。评价不，不能完成该端由于价值观的缺失在系统的生产率数据。我想建议的工资设定在关键的工作速率不工作的评价程序的对象。

如果工作分析和工作评价是完全指定的公司劳动的各种程序必须雇用，许多有关工资管理和工资理论问题消失。岗位评价的作用是不确定的工资，这将评价每个类别的劳务。相反的，如果希望吸引劳动力，这是市场的设置率调查工作以来，公司必须支付的市场工资（或工资的范围内去率）。工作和工资结构，对关键工作的工资不设置方法。工作分析和工作评价描述，在公司需要和特定种类市场表明，为吸引急需的各类工人，必须提供足以吸引人的工资率。